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INSTREAM FLOW REGULATION: PLUGGING THE
HOLES IN MAINE'S WATER LAW*
Bradford Bowman 1
Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat [water runs, and ought to run,
as it has used to run].2
I. INTRODUCTION
States East of the Mississippi River have long relied on the traditional com-
mon law of riparian rights to manage their water resources. Towards the end of the
Twentieth Century, rising demand for consumptive water use due to population
growth, modem agricultural practices and industrialization began to conflict with
environmental concerns. Throughout the East, states recognized the riparian
doctrine's failure to provide a reliable means for allocating water during times of
scarcity. In response, most of these states replaced common law water rights with
regulatory water management systems. Maine is the only state that has not fol-
lowed this trend.
It is not surprising that the issue of water allocation should arise so belatedly
in Maine given that its water resources are incredibly abundant. However, in-
creased demand for consumption of the state's flowing waters has diminished their
flow. In some areas this impairment has jeopardized critical fish and wildlife habi-
tat. These changes are due to greater levels of water withdrawal 3 for municipal
*After this paper was first written in late 2000, a drought pushed the issue of water with-
drawal to the forefront of Maine's environmental concerns. As a result, the state's legislature
finally addressed the topic of streamflow regulation. L.D. 1488 (120th Legis. 2001). An Act to
require Major Water Users to Provide Information About Their Annual Water Withdrawals from
Public Water Resources, was introduced into the 120th Legislature in March of 2001. 1 Legis.
Rec. 253 (2001). The bill met strong resistance from agricultural interests and the skiing indus-
try. That resistance was overcome when, two weeks before Governor Angus King formally
submitted a request to the Federal Emergency Management Agency that Maine be declared a
disaster area due to drought conditions, the Legislature enacted 38 M.R.S.A. §470-A--470-G.
See David Connerty-Marin, King Files for Federal Disaster Aid, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr.
11, 2002, at lA; Tom Bell, FEMA to Assess Drought's Damage, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Mar.
28, 2002. These provisions require all water withdrawals beyond a certain threshold amount to
be reported to the Maine Department of Environmental Protection. Lacking any substantive
controls on withdrawal, however, the law is primarily a data collection device. Nonetheless, it
represents a much needed first step in responding to the changing balance of Maine's water
resources, and hopefully, after sufficient data is compiled, will lead to further legislation such as
discussed in this paper.
1. B.S., University of California at Davis, 1996; M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School, 1998; J.D.,
University of Maine School of Law, 2001. I would like to thank Laura Rose Day, Watershed
Director of the Natural Resources Council of Maine, for her assistance and guidance with this
topic, and for her tireless efforts to restore Maine's rivers.
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (6TH ED. 1990) (quoting JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1832)).
3. For the purposes of this report, the terms water withdrawal, consumptive water use, and,
occasionally, water diversion will all be used synonymously and in their plainest sense: the
removal of water from a water source, unless the water removed is returned not long after its
original withdrawal, to the same location, and unchanged in volume.
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use, agriculture, hydropower, and snow making. In Maine the need for a regula-
tory water management system has been heralded by an increase in irrigation for
crops such as potatoes, cranberries, and blueberries.4 Recent events involving
these agricultural industries in the Downeastern and northernmost regions of the
state have made it apparent that business as usual is no longer possible with the our
water resources. Rather, as water resources are further limited by the increasing
demands of developing industrial and agricultural uses, the need to regulate its
consumption in order to further more efficient and ecologically sound manage-
ment will necessarily lead to a repudiation of traditional common law water rights.
This transformation has already taken place in the rest of the Eastern United States. 5
It is now apparent that Maine stands on the same threshold.
Part I of this paper analyzes the need to develop a water management system
that controls consumptive uses of Maine's fresh surface waters, first, in terms of
ecological necessity; and second, in relation to the effectiveness of existing state
water law. Part H assesses and compares the effectiveness of creating that man-
agement system by promulgating regulations under preexisting water quality stat-
utes, a method proposed by the state, with the need for enacting comprehensive
legislation. Various aspects of water allocation schemes adopted by other states
are proposed as a means of plugging the holes in Maine's water law.
II. DOES MAINE NEED TO REGULATE CONSUMPTIVE WATER USE?
A. Are Maine's Rivers Running Dry?
Both commercially and ecologically, Maine's rivers are perhaps its most valu-
able natural resources. In 1867, Governor Joshua Chamberlain ordered a com-
plete survey of these great resources. Two years later the State Hydrologist re-
ported his findings:
The people of the State of Maine may justly congratulate themselves upon the
fact.., that our grand resource is of a kind that will never fail or become materi-
ally modified, because it is based upon the unchanging features and sustained by
the perpetually recuperative processes of nature. It can never fail .... 6
Time has not born out the survey's optimistic predications. Rather, the "perpetu-
ally recuperative processes of nature" have been outpaced by the impacts of hu-
man endeavor. In Maine's early industrial phase of development, the use of "our
grand resource" was dominated by the paper and power industries, and these im-
4. See Phyllis Austin, Potato Irrigation Pond Prompts Federal-State Clash, MAINE TIMES,
June 24, 1999, at 9; Brenda Seekins, DEP Accuses Hartland of Water-Flow Violations, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, May 28, 1999; Mary Anne Clancy, Salmon Win Fight Over Irrigation, Water Use
Strict on Downeast Rivers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 1999.
5. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Eastern Water Law: Regulated Riparianism Re-
places Riparian Rights in THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW MANUAL 317, 324 (Richard J. Fink ed.,
1995); Joseph Dellapenna, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE iii-viii (1997); Robert
Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1989); Rob-
ert Abrams, Water Allocation By Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Considering A
Move Away From Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255 (1990); George William Sherk, Eastern
Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287 (1990).
6. WALTER WELLS, THE WATER-POWER OF MAINE: A HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY OF MAINE 66 (1869).
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pacts took the form of water quality degradation. 7 As a result, Maine's water
management system is primarily focused on water quality.8 As Maine's economy
has grown and diversified in recent times, so too has the use of its flowing waters.
A demand for the consumptive use of the state's waters has now formed and Maine's
water management system has not yet been adjusted to address the impacts associ-
ated with these new uses.
The effects of these new and significant consumptive demands first became
apparent in the northernmost region of the state where agricultural interests have
long struggled against out-of-state markets. In 1995, excessive water withdrawal
for crop irrigation in northern Maine killed fish and damaged lake beds. Similar
problems were recorded by game wardens on other waterbodies in the area. The
State responded in 1996, when a number of state agencies-including the Maine
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Maine Department of Agri-
culture, and the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife-jointly implemented
a policy aimed at curbing low flows in Aroostook County.9 Although this policy
established a number of procedural requirements for handling citizen complaints,
it was otherwise voluntary and failed to establish minimum low flow standards for
streams, or place any substantive limits on irrigation withdrawals. 10
In 1997, numerous complaints were lodged with the Maine Land Use Regula-
tory Commission (LURC) citing reduced lake levels and stream flows in
Downeastern Maine.11 Landowners accused the excessive water withdrawals by
cranberry and blueberry growers of causing fish kills, algal blooms and disrupting
salmon habitat. 12 The effects of irrigation on salmon were of particular concern to
the state, which had just avoided listing Atlantic salmon on the endangered species
list by producing the Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan for Seven Maine Riv-
ers. 13 In spite of the danger to salmon, and threat of federal intervention, the state
responded by placing only voluntary water withdrawal limitations on a few se-
lected rivers. 14
The following year it became clear that voluntary water use limits were not
protecting salmon habitat. During the summer of 1998, the LURC issued an irri-
7. See generally JEROME G. DAVIAU, MAINE'S LIFE BLOOD (1958); see also Robert F Blomquist,
What is Past is Prologue: Senator Edmund S. Muskie's Environmental Policymaking Roots as
Governor of Maine, 1955-58, 51 ME. L. REV. 88, 98-128 (1999) (detailing Maine's earliest ef-
forts at curtailing pollution).
8. Maine's primary instrument of water law is its water quality classification scheme, Title
38, sections 464-70 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated (West 2001 and Supp. 2001),
enacted in accordance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
9. How to Deal With Low Periods and Irrigating Farmers and Environmental Concerns in
Aroostook County, Aroostook Water and Soil Management Board, adopted Mar. 1, 1996.
10. Id.
11. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, 92 Me. Govt. Reg. 56, DP-3624-E (1998);
Phyllis Austin, Cherryfield Foods Gets Water Permit, But Only For This Year, MAINE TIMES,
July 23, 1998, at 10.
12. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, 92 Me. Govt. Reg. 56, DP-3624-E (1998);
Phyllis Austin, Cherryfield Foods Gets Water Permit, But Only For This Year, MAINE TIMES,
July 23, 1998, at 10.
13. Maine Atlantic Salmon Task Force, Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan for Seven Maine
Rivers, Mar. 1997.
14. Mary Anne Clancy, Council Puts Limits on Use of River, Salmon Protection Spurs Irriga-
tion Restriction, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 1998; Mary Anne Clancy, Grower to Draw Wa-
ter From Down East Rivers, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, June 18, 1998.
[Vol. 54:2
INSTREAM FLOW REGULATION
gation permit to Cherryfield Foods, placing the first quantitative limitations ever
imposed on irrigation practices in the State. 15 Local residents and environmental
organizations argued that the controls were inadequate. 16 The criticism led the
DEP to begin drafting a water withdrawal regulation, 17 and the LURC to further
limit Cherryfield's water withdrawal permit. 18
By the summer of 2000, quantity had finally displaced quality at the center of
the ongoing debate about how to best manage Maine's water resources: efforts to
compel federal agencies to list the Atlantic Salmon under the Endangered Species
Act began to make progress; the LURC further limited water withdrawal by
Cherryfield Foods19 ; and farmers, berry growers, ski area operators, and environ-
mental organizations finally gathered with State and Federal agencies to discuss
the need for regulating water withdrawal.20 Although these events established
water withdrawal as an important environmental issue in the State, no progress has
yet been made towards finding an effective management solution; and the DEP has
actually withdrawn its proposed water withdrawal regulation from the rulemaking
process. 2 1
Reports of fish kills and degraded river habitat by landowners, sportsmen, and
environmentalists have conclusively shown that Maine's rivers are in danger of
running dry. The remaining question is how dry? Long-term data is not yet avail-
able to perform the stream flow studies needed to answer that question in a mean-
ingful way. Nonetheless, it is apparent, and the State has now acknowledged, that
Maine rivers, both Downeast and in the North, cannot support present levels of
withdrawal during times of scarcity. 22 This finding alone is enough to institute
some form of control on water withdrawal that, as data is collected and analyzed,
can be refined to reflect a better understanding of the needs of each watershed.
Even though the impacts of consumptive water use are now evident, progress
has been delayed by concern for the economic impacts that use limitations will
15. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, 92 Me. Gov. Reg. 56-57 DP-3624-E (1998);
see also Mary Anne Clancy, Grower to Draw Water From Downeast Rivers, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, June 18, 1998.
16. Oma Izakson, Group Prepares Suit Against Salmon Plan, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19,
1998; see also Mary Anne Clancy, Maine Touts Progress in Salmon Protection, Down East
Group Working On Irrigation Issue, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 1999.
17. Mary Anne Clancy, Maine Trouts' Progress in Salmon Protection, Down East Group
Work On Irrigation Issue, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 1999.
18. LURC Development Permit 3624, available at the LURC field office in Washington
County, Maine.
19. Mary Anne Clancy, Cherryfield Irrigation Permit Strictest Yet, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May
22, 2000.
20. Susan Young, Federal Fish Fracas Continues over Irrigation Policy Debate, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, July 20, 2000.
21. As the MDEP was retreating from its early efforts to regulate water withdrawals, the
legislature debated the means of providing relief for irrigators whose withdrawals had been
hampered by dry seasons. L.D. 2340 would have extended the financial assistance of the Agri-
cultural Marketing Loan Fund to "the purchase of land in connection with development of new
cranberry acreage or irrigation reservoirs or to provide direct access to water for irrigation .. "
L.D. 2340 (119th Legis. 2000). An appropriations bill, L.D. 2493 proposed $7,500,000 in funds
to help blueberry growers "design, develop, and construct irrigation water sources .. " L.D.
2493 (119th Legis. 2000). Although the latter bill made passing reference to the Maine Atlantic
Salmon Task Force, it did nothing to address the low streamflow effects that would follow from
increased irrigation levels. Id.
22. Susan Young, Federal Fish Fracas Continues over Irrigation Policy Debate, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, July 20, 2000, at 1.
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have on the industries that now depend on a steady supply of water. Berry grow-
ers, predominantly located in the State's poorest region, point out that irrigation
more than triples their crop yield. 2 3 Berries have become big business for
Downeastern Maine with industry production climbing from 35 million pounds in
the early 1980s to over 70 million pounds at the close of the millennium. 24 Cur-
rently, berry-growing takes place on over 60,000 acres of Washington and Hancock
County land, creates nearly 8000 jobs seasonally, and produces a $75 million crop. 25
Considering the region's otherwise narrow economic base, these statistics are sig-
nificant, but so is the demand for water that these industries place on their water-
sheds. Berry growers estimated water withdrawal for 1995 at over 530 million
gallons over 6000 acres. 26 In the absence of regulation this figure is expected to
increase to one billion gallons by 2001.27
Similar economic figures are put forward to justify demand for water in
Aroostook County by vegetable farmers for irrigation and, in the western portion
of the State, by ski area operators for snowmaking. 2 8 Certainly, any water man-
agement system that is developed for the State needs to consider these economic
concerns, but they must be balanced by an understanding of the impacts these
industries have on the watersheds in which they operate. As the following section
explores, these impacts undermine the natural character and beauty of Maine's
flowing waters and wildlands--qualities that the state has pledged to protect.
B. The Ecological Impacts of Low Flows
Regardless of its importance to cranberry and blueberry growers, water, in the
proper amounts and at the appropriate times, is critical to the functioning of any
riverine ecosystem.29 Native river species are adapted for life within a specific
range of environmental characteristics. 30 Their survival and reproduction is de-
pendent upon the fluctuation of a number of physical variables: water tempera-
ture, substrate grain size and distribution, dissolved oxygen, turbidity, and depth.3 1
These environmental dimensions are in turn directly dependent upon the nature of
the river's discharge. Flow characteristics such as the timing, frequency, duration,
and the rate of change of flow are, therefore, all determinative of the diversity and
integrity of any given watershed. 32 Thus, "[c]urrent is the most significant char-
acteristic of running water, and it is in their adaptations to constantly flowing wa-
23. Dieter Bradbury, Fate of the Atlantic Salmon, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 30, 2000, at
6A.
24. Id.
25. Mary Anne Clancy, LURC Vote Expected on Application to Dig Blueberry Land Irriga-
tion Well, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2000; Bradbury, supra note 23, at 6A.
26. Mary Anne Clancy, Tribe, LURC Disagree On Water Pumps, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, June
30, 1999, at B5.
27. Id.
28. Mary Anne Clancy, Drought Boosts State's Thirst for Irrigation Systems, BANG6R DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2001.
29. See generally N. Le Roy Poff et al., The Natural Flow Regime: A Paradigm for River
Conservation and Restoration, 47 No. 11 BIoScIENCE 769 (1997) (noting that the exploitation of
rivers inhibits ability of those rivers to support native species or sustain healthy ecosystems).
30. NANCY GORDON ET AL., STREAM HYDROLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION FOR EcOLOGISTS 18-25 (1992);
See generally J. DAVID ALLAN, STREAM ECOLOGY (1995).
31. See generally GORDON, supra note 30, at 18-25; ALLAN, supra note 30, generally.
32. Brian D. Richter, How Much Water Does A River Need?, 37 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 231,
232 (1997) (collecting references).
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ter that many stream animals differ from their still-water relatives."'33
The morphology of any given river forms the foundation of its ecosystem.
The alteration of a river or stream's flow regime necessarily results in drastic changes
to the physical habitat available for the species that live there. 34 Less energetic
discharges are incapable of maintaining a watercourse's normal sediment budget.35
Rivers so affected are unable to entrain the larger sediment that once flowed freely
down its channel. As heavier sediments are deposited, riverbeds aggrade and chan-
nel size decreases. 36 Species that rely on the large interstitial spaces between
course grains of sediment are forced out by the deposition of fines. 37 Although the
impact of this process has been closely studied on salmonid populations in relation
to the availability of spawning area,38 it has consequences that reach out to a far
larger array of species than just salmon. Numerous species of fish, as well as
macro and micro invertebrates that rely on these interstitial spaces for the survival
of their eggs or the success of their larval stages are all adversely affected by the
accumulation of fine sediments in the river bed.39
As the flow of a river decreases, so too does its channel size. The reduction in
channel size (or loss of wetted perimeter) that results from impaired streamflow,
exposes new portions of stream bank that are frequently colonized by non-native
opportunistic plant species.40 The invasion of exotic species threatens the diver-
sity of native riparian flora and the animal species that depend on their unique
qualities.
Low flows also impair the functioning of other important ecological processes
that are related to sediment transport. Downstream ecosystems--estuaries, flood
plains, and the lower reaches of the river-depend on sediment movement to ex-
port organic resources, such as detritus and detached periphytons, from upstream.
The nutrient supply of a river drives the productivity of these ecosystems and, as
such, the relative abundance of species present in flowing waters is directly related
to the intensity of streamflow.
The impacts of diminished instream flow affect the physical characteristics of
the water as much as the physical characteristics of the watercourse. During peri-
ods of low flow, temperatures rise, salinity levels increase, and the concentration
of dissolved oxygen is reduced. 4 1 The alteration of these physical variables can
strike a tremendous blow to riverine ecosystems, touching every trophic level of
the food chain.
Primary production of organic material is supplied by periphytons-algae and
mosses attached to the substrate of the river. These species are valuable not only
33. HUGH B.N. HYNES, THE ECOLOGY OF RUNNING WATERS, 121 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1970)
(the seminal work on the impacts of alterations to the natural flow regime); see also Poff, supra
note 29, at 769 (stating that streamflow quantity "can be considered a 'master variable' that
limits the distribution and abundance of riverine species.").
34. Franklin K. Ligon et al., Downstream Ecological Effects of Dams: A Geomorphic Per-
spective, 45 No. 3 BIOSCIENCE 183, 183 (1995). See generally Mary E. Power et al., Biotic and
Abiotic Controls in River and Stream Communities, 7 J. N. AM. BENTHOL. Soc. 456 (1988).
35. Ligon, supra note 34, at 183 (noting that a dam "alter[s] the flow of sediment").
36. Id. at 189.
37. GORDON, supra note 30, at 18.
38. Ligon, supra note 34, at 185-87.
39. Poff, supra note 29, at 773.
40. Id. at 777.
41. GORDON, supra note 30, at 19.
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for the nutrients they supply but for the shelter they provide small invertebrates.4 2
Additionally, the close relationship between these plants and fish species, espe-
cially trout, is well documented.4 3 Many species of periphyton are particularly
intolerant to environmental stresses; this means reduced flows may affect the very
foundation of riverine ecosystems. 44
One rung up the trophic ladder the myriad of lotic and benthic invertebrates-
insects, crustaceans, mollusks and worms-account for the largest portion of any
river's biodiversity.45 These species rely on a steady supply of clean, oxygen rich
water to sustain them and serve as indicator species used to assess the health of
river ecosystems.46 Alterations in the physical and chemical characteristics of the
water can result in high mortality rates among these species, thereby depriving fish
of an important supply of food.4 7
Finally, fish, situated near the top of the river food chain, rely on a narrow
range of stream characteristics that they have adapted to over their long evolution-
ary histories. Because they rely on the ecological health of all the trophic levels
below them, they are potentially subject to a larger variety of environmental stresses
than any other component of the ecosystem. Fish require sufficient dissolved oxy-
gen to breathe, adequately large invertebrate and plant populations for food, par-
ticular types of substrate to reproduce, and the availability of pools for shelter
from predators. As noted above, the availability of all of these biological necessi-
ties are impaired by the low flows that result from water diversions and withdraw-
als.4 8
Salmonid spawning is one facet of diminished streamflow that has particu-
larly drawn the attention of researchers. Atlantic salmon rely on the occurrence of
certain streanflows as a biological trigger to initiate spawning.49 Spawning re-
quires the availability of a riverbed composed of small cobbles and gravel (100 to
150 mm. in diameter) in which the Salmon dig "redds" (nests). 50 Once they have
been deposited and fertilized in the redds, salmon eggs need a steady flow of water
to supply oxygen and flush out waste materials. 5 1 Reduced streamflow affects
this process in two ways: first, by reducing the area available for spawning; and
second, by increasing the mortality rate of the eggs that are successfully laid. 52
Altering the flow regime creates a substitution of an established hydrologic
system that native species may be poorly adapted to.53 Although salmon acutely
feel the stresses associated with this substitution, it must be remembered that they
are born by the ecosystem as a whole, and that "entire food webs, not just single
species" may suffer the consequences. 54 The cumulative effect of water quantity
42. Joseph S. McLean, Note, Streamflow Policy in Vermont: Managing Conflicting Demands
on the State's Waters, 19 VT. L. REV. 191, 198 (1994).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. GORDON, supra note 30, at 21.
46. McLean, supra note 42, at 199.
47. Id. at 200.
48. See generally C.E. Cushing, Sunshine, Bugs and Trout, 29 TROUT (Spring 1995).
49. Id. at 203.
50. Ligon, supra note 34, at 185.
51. McLean, supra note 42, at 203.
52. Ligon, supra note 34, at 185.
53. Poff, supra note 29, at 778.
54. Id. The "food web" referred to here extends beyond the river and includes riparian plant




mismanagement on Maine's watersheds, when added to the stresses associated
with water quality mismanagement could be devastating. Indeed, hydraulic re-
gime alteration alone has been identified as one of the most significant threats to
freshwater biodiversity.55 However, "Ujlust as rivers have been incrementally
modified, they can be incrementally restored."56 Deriving and implementing the
correct method of management is the most important step in that restoration pro-
cess.
C. Maine's Existing Water Resource Management Tools
Establishing the ecological necessity for a management scheme controlling
water withdrawal is only the first part of the problem. It is also necessary to re-
view Maine water law and determine whether there are existing resource manage-
ment tools that could be implemented to stabilize instream flow. Maine is the only
eastern state that has yet to enact water resource allocation legislation. 57 Given
this, we must turn to common law water rights and existing water management
statutes and determine if these may be adapted for use as an operative body of law
for controlling water withdrawal.
1. Private Rights in Water: Riparianism
The body of common law specifying who may take or alter flowing water is
known as the law of riparian rights. The term "riparian" is derived from the Latin
word ripa, meaning stream bank. Thus, "riparian rights" refers to the bundle of
rights that arise by virtue of owning land that is contiguous with a flowing water-
course. 58 They are distinguishable from "littoral" rights, which are appurtenant to
the ownership of land abutting an ocean or lake, although the two terms are often
used interchangeably. 59 The rights of riparian landowners include nonconsumptive
as well as consumptive use of water adjoining their property.6 0 Nonconsumptive
uses often affect water quality and are strictly controlled in Maine, as in the rest of
the country, by extensive water quality legislation.6 1 Therefore, with respect to
water quality, state and federal law have largely preempted riparianism, however,
this is not the case in our state with respect to water quantity. Maine's lack of
statutory and regulatory control over the consumptive use of flowing water means
that the ancient common law doctrine of riparian rights is the operative law regard-
55. See generally Brian D. Richter et al., Threats to Imperiled Freshwater Fauna, 11 CoNs.
Bio. 1081, 1081-93 (1997) (discussing the results of a survey which addressed threats to natural
hydralogic regimes in regions across the country).
56. Poff, supra note 29, at 780.
57. Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 324.
58. In practice, riparian rights attach not only to surface waters (navigable and non-navigable
rivers and streams) but to diffuse surface waters (water from rains, springs, or melting snow
with little or no flow) and lakes as well. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
§§ 3:11-3:14 (2001). See Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 503-508, 106 A. 865, 865-869
(1919); State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76,79, 72A. 875,877 (1909); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9,
23 (1849).
59. JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS 300-01 (1891); CARROLL DUNSCOMBE,
RIPARIAN AND LITTORAL RIGHTS 1 (1970). Maine is one of the few remaining eastern states in
which this distinction remains important. See Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. at 505-08, 106 A.
at 868-69 (1919).
60. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter 1 Beck].
61. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 §§ 464-470.
2002]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
ing stream flow in the state. This is known as "pure riparianism. ' '6 2
The basic elements of the riparian doctrine were first set forth in 1827 by
Justice Story, sitting as a federal circuit judge, in Tyler v. Wilkinson.63 This case
announced two conflicting sets of theories governing water rights. The first is
concerned with the natural flow of a river: "[N]o [riparian] proprietor has a right
to use the water to the prejudice of another .... [N]o one has a right to diminish
the quantity which will, according to the natural current, flow to a proprietor be-
low, or to throw it back upon a proprietor above." 64
The second water rights theory found in Tyler considers injury to co-riparians
from "reasonable uses":
There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common to all, a
reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is, whether it
is to the injury of the other proprietors or not. There may be a diminution in
quantity, or a retardation or acceleration of the natural current indispensable for
the general and valuable use of the water .... 65
One year after Tyler, Chancellor Kent incorporated Justice Story's dual inter-
pretation of water rights into his Commentaries,66 placing a somewhat greater
emphasis on the right to natural flow: "Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a
river, has naturally an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream
adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run, (currere solebat,) without diminution
or alteration. ' 67 However, "[sItreams of water are intended for the use and com-
fort of man; and it would be unreasonable, and contrary to the universal sense of
mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of the water to
domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes .... "68
These two sources provided the early foundations for riparian water law in the
United States and in England. 69 The water right they create is a qualified property
right or usufructory right. That is to say, a riparian proprietor does not own the
water that flows through his land, but has only a right to its use and flow.70
In the early stages of its development, Maine's mill economy dictated that
current (flow) was the most valuable attribute of a river. As such, early water law
in Maine and in many eastern states emphasized natural flow over reasonable use.
In Blanchard v. Baker,7 1 an 1832 case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court stated:
It is an ancient and well-established principal, that [water] cannot lawfully be
diverted, unless it is returned again to its accustomed channel .... The propri-
etor of [a] watercourse has a right to avail himself of its momentum as a power.
. [aind he may make a reasonable use of the water itself.., provided it is not..
essentially diminished. 72
62. 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 6.01(a).
63. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
64. Id. at 474.
65. Id.
66. 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1832).
67. Id. at 439.
68. Id. at 440.
69. Samuel C. Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the
Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1918). See also LtJDWIK A.
TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1985).
70. See Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. 190, 199 (1908).
71. 8 Me. 253 (1832).
72. Id. at 266.
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Under the natural flow theory a riparian proprietor's right is violated by any
use that diminishes the flow past his land regardless of whether he has been in-
jured by the diversion.73 Such close control over water usage left riparians with
virtually no use of the water flowing through their property. For this reason a
limited exception for "domestic" needs (such as water for bathing, drinking, and
household purposes) was created. 74 These domestic or "natural" needs were dis-
tinguished from "artificial" needs such as irrigation, mining, manufacturing, power
generation, and large-scale livestock watering. 75
As an industrial economy began to supplant the mill economy, demand for
consumptive use of water resources began to exceed what the simple domestic
needs exception could accommodate. The strict water appropriation limitations
imposed on riparian proprietors by the natural flow rule conflicted with these new
demands, and courts soon began to expand riparian rights by shifting to the rea-
sonable use theory.76 This transition did not occur in Maine until 1885 with the
Law Court's decision in Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence:77
Every proprietor upon a natural stream is entitled to the reasonable use and en-
joyment of such stream as it flows through or along his own land, taking into
consideration a like reasonable use of such stream by all other proprietors above
or below him. The rights of the owners are not absolute but qualified, and each
party must exercise his own reasonable use with a just regard to the like reason-
able use by all others who may be affected by his acts. Any diversion or obstruc-
tion which substantially and materially diminishes the quantity of water, so that it
does not flow as it has been accustomed to.... thereby preventing the use of it for
any of the reasonable and proper purposes to which it is usually applied, is an
infringement of the rights of other owners of land through which the stream flows.
78
The Law Court noted that "[t]he law does not lay down any fixed rule for deter-
mining what is a reasonable use of the water of a stream" and that a determination
of reasonableness depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. 79 The
decision lists a number of relevant factors to consider:
[T]he subject matter of the use; the occasion and manner of its application; the
object, extent, necessity and duration of the use; the nature and size of the stream;
the kind of business to which it is subservient; the importance and necessity of
the use claimed by one party[; ... the state of improvement of the country in
regard to mills and machinery, and the use of water as a propelling power; the
general and established usages of the country in similar cases; and all the other
and ever varying circumstances of each particular case, bearing upon the ques-
tion of the fitness and propriety of the use of the water under consideration. 80
The reasonable use rule found in Lockwood, as it relates to water quantity, has
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also City of Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 98 Me. 576, 38 A. 561 (Me.
1897).
75. See J.H. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, t0
BUFF. L. REV. 448,452-53 (1960-61).
76. See, e.g., Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 424 (1874); Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d
129, 132-33 (Ark. 1955).
77. 77 Me. 297 (1885).
78. Id. at 316.
79. Id. at 316-17.
80. Id. at 317 (quoting Red River Rolling Mills v. Wright, 15 N.W. 167, 169 (Minn. 1883)).
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remained essentially the same for over a century.8 1 It allows each riparian to di-
vert and use water in quantities that are reasonable considering the size of a water-
course and the comparative needs of other riparians. Where a lower riparian does
not suffer actual damage, a diminishment in flow is considered damnum absque
injuria (harm without injury) and may not be enjoined. 82
The abstract standards put forward in Lockwood for determining reasonable-
ness have been applied more frequently to cases challenging degradation than di-
version.83 As a result, there are few functional definitions of unreasonable water
withdrawal in Maine's riparian caselaw.
At least one form of consumptive use is categorically unreasonable in Maine.
The so-called watershed limitation prohibits the diversion of water on non-ripar-
ian land or outside of the watershed. 84 Beyond this limitation, however, the ortho-
dox riparianism operating within the state sets no concrete limitations on water
withdrawal. Nearly every conceivable use has been considered reasonable by the
Law Court at one time or another and no challenges have been brought in Maine in
which riparian rights were used to protect a river ecosystem for anything other
than its recreational value. 85
In its present state, the doctrine of riparian rights is best suited to deal with
disputes concerning the allocation of water use rights between competing users.
Early riparian cases utilizing the natural or uniform flow theory to assure stable
flows for mill owners could be useful for protecting instream flow, but Maine has
rejected the natural flow theory and now requires a showing of actual injury to a
riparian proprietor before any upstream use may be enjoined.8 6 Accordingly,
riparianism may only be used to preserve river ecosystems if the Law Court finds
a right to healthy river habitat within the bundle of riparian rights. Recreational
uses and scenic value may be asserted as proxies for preservation of unique and
vital ecosystems, 87 but this approach elevates concern for the symptom (faltering
fish population) over that for the disease (failing ecosystem) and may not, in the
long term, effectively treat the real problem. Even if ecological health were found
81. Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106A. 865 (1919):
[The riparian proprietor] does not own the water itself, but he has the right to the
natural flow of the stream, and the right to the use and benefit of it, as it passes through
his land, for all the domestic and agricultural purposes to which it can reasonably be
applied, and no proprietor above or below can unreasonably divert, obstruct or pol-
lute it.
Id. at 507, 106 A. at 868. See also Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water Dist. v. Me.
Turnpike Auth., 145 Me. 35, 42-43, 71 A.2d 520, 526 (1950); Stanton v. Trs. of St. Joseph's
Coll., 233 A.2d 718, 721 (Me. 1967).
82. See TARLOCK, supra note 58, § 3.12 (2001).
83. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297 (1885); Stanton v. Trs. of St. Joseph's Coll.,
233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967) (Stanton I).
84. See Stanton v. Trs. of St. Joseph's Coll., 254 A.2d 597, 599 (Me. 1969) (Stanton II) ("In
the instant case the upstream use is nonriparian and hence the upstream riparian owner will not
be allowed to assert the reasonable use doctrine against the lower riparian owners"); see also
Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water Dist. v. Me. Turnpike. Auth., 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d
520.
85. M. DAWSON, WATER LAW IN MAINE: REPORT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUBCOMMITTEE, 7-8
(1991) (collecting cases).
86. Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water Dist. v. Me. Turnpike Auth., 71 A.2d 520,
(1950) (noting that no action lies against an upstream proprietor where the claimant has no
corresponding riparian right).
87. See generally Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955).
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to be a protected riparian right, the doctrine limits standing to co-riparians and thus
makes a universal concern enforceable by only a relative minority of landown-
ers.
8 8
Furthermore, the standard of reasonableness, adapted as it is to settling dis-
putes between competing commercial uses, fails to consider and preserve the hy-
drological characteristics that are prerequisite to the healthy functioning of any
river. The balance struck in pure riparianism is between the reasonableness of an
upstream diversion versus a downstream one; and not, as it needs to be, between
the effective operation of forces in a drainage basin that control sediment delivery
to channels and sediment transport from the basin. Just as the riparian doctrine
failed to address concern for water quality, it has failed to apportion water usage in
a way that is protective of Maine's valuable river ecosystems.
2. Public Water Use Rights
Riparian water rights are limited by the private rights of other riparian propri-
etors and, to a certain extent, by the rights of the public at large to use the water
resources of a state for navigation and fishing. Public rights restrain both private
and governmental parties from interfering with the public's use and enjoyment of
navigable waters. Recently, legal commentators have suggested that common law
public use rights might serve as a basis for requiring stable instream flow and lake
levels. 89 This approach relies, however, on expanding the traditional sphere of
protected public and primarily commercial rights, namely navigation and fishing,
to include a right to ecological integrity. Courts in a limited number of jurisdic-
tions have reformulated public water rights in terms of modem concern for the
environment. 90 The possibility of adapting these arguments to Maine must be
considered in the search for a means to control water withdrawal from the state's
rivers.
The origin of public water rights in the United States is the public trust doc-
trine, a venerable common law doctrine with roots in Roman law.9 1 In Justinian's
Institutes it is declared: "'By natural law all these things are common, viz: air,
running water, the sea and as a consequence the shores of the sea.' 92 According
to this civil law principle, resources such as flowing waters, the sea and its shore
88. Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water Dist. v. Me. Turnpike Auth., 71 A.2d at
525.
89. See Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of
Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. Rev. 407, 424-25 (1986); Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water
Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 323, 331 (1990); Jan S.
Stevens, Current Developments in the Public Trust Doctrine and Other Instream Protection
Methods in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 141 (1995).
90. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that patentee of tidelands
owns the soil, subject to easement of the public trust to enter upon for purposes of preservation
and other uses); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 729 (Cal.
1983); Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1261
(Colo. 1995) (construing the State Water Code to allow individuals greater power to seek relief
from the Water Board); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
91. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 16 (1976).
92. Samuel C. Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. at 199 (quoting Justinian Inst., tit. I, §
I) (discussing the expanding role of the public trust doctrine in environmental law).
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were common to all and excluded from private ownership.9 3 This view of the sea
as a common resource passed into English common law where it persisted as a
vague legal theory until, in 1667, Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale revitalized it in
his De Jure Maris.94 Hale asserted that title to all land submerged below navi-
gable tidal waters ultimately rested with the sovereign. 95 The crown could allow
title to pass into private ownership, but it remained always subject to the jus pub-
licum-the rights of the general public. 96 By the time England's common law
traveled to the American colonies, the public was entitled to use navigable inter-
tidal waters for navigation and fishing, and could enjoin private landowners from
interfering with those uses. 97
Nineteenth century American courts interpreted the jus publicum as creating a
public trust in which navigable waters were held by the state for the benefit of the
public: 98
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the
manner of lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the public for
the purposes of commerce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by indi-
viduals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right.
Therefore the title and the control of them are vested in the sovereign for the
benefit of the whole people.99
In view of the country's vast freshwater resources, American courts expanded the
reach of the traditional common law and included non-tidal navigable rivers,
streams, lakes, and ponds within the public trust as well. 100
Maine and Massachusetts law governing public rights in water resources was
modified by the statutory and common law of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and
as such, is at variance with the rest of the states. 10 1 The Colonial Ordinance of
1641-47102 altered traditional common law public rights in two ways: first, by
removing the public's right to use tidal flats, and second, by extending public rights
93. See Deveney, supra note 91, at 31.
94. "[T]here be... rivers, as well fresh as salt, that are common or publick use for carriage of
boats or lighters. And these, whether they are fresh or salt, whether they flow and reflow or not,
are prima facie public juris, common highways for man or goods or both .. " Lord Chief
Justice Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, in A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING
THERETO 374, 374 (Stuart A. Moore ed., 3d ed. 1888).
95. Id. at 376.
96. Id. at 389-90.
97. Deveney, supra note 91, at 41.
98. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 24-25 (1821); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.
367,412-13 (1842); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894).
99. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
100. See id. at 18-26.
101. Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. R. 623, 624 (1998).
102. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 510A.2d 509,512-13 (Me. 1986) (quoting LIBERTIES COMMON
§ 2, THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF MASSACHU-
SE'IrS 35 (Cambridge, Mass., 1648); (photo reprint, T. Barnes, ed. 1975):
Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in any
great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers so far as the Sea ebs and flows, within the
precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men of the same town, or the
General Court have otherwise appropriated them. Provided that no town shall appro-
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to "great ponds."' 103 In both places the ordinance reserved to the public the rights
of fishing, fowling, and navigation. 104 Although the Colonial Ordinance was ef-
fectively rendered void by the abrogation of the colonial charter, it continued as
part of the common law of Massachusetts. 10 5 By virtue of section 6 of "the Act of
Separation between Maine and Massachusetts," and Article X, section 3 of the
Maine Constitution, the ordinance was incorporated into Maine's common law as
well. 106 The result is an irregular pattern of public water rights that varies accord-
ing to waterbody classification.
Public rights are greatest in the state's "great ponds," which is defined by the
Colonial Ordinance as those with greater than ten acres of surface area. 107 Own-
ership of the great ponds lies exclusively with the state, which holds them in trust
for public use. 108 For this reason, the Law Court has stated that the water level of
the great ponds may not be altered "below [the] natural low-water mark, nor raise
and hold them above their natural level" without legislative consent. 109 Maine
courts have protected not only the traditional rights of fishing, fowling, and navi-
gation originally guaranteed by the Colonial Ordinance, 110 but also modem recre-
ational uses of the waterbodies as well. "11
priate to any particular person or persons, any great Pond conteining more then ten
acres of land: and that no man shall come upon anothers proprietie without their
leave otherwise then as heerafter expressed; the which clearly to determin, it is de-
clared that in all creeks, coves and other places, about and upon salt water where the
Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoyning shall have proprietie to the
low water mark where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more
wheresoever it ebs farther. Provided that such Proprietor shall not by this libertie
have power to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels in, or through any
sea creeks, or coves to other mens houses or lands. And for great Ponds lying in
common though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for any man to fish
and fowl there, and may passe and repasse on foot through any mans proprietie for
that end, so they trespasse not upon any mans corn or meadow.
Id.
103. See, e.g., Herbert E. Locke, Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance,
12 ME. L. REV. 148, 149 (1919); Lincoln Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in
Northern New England, 30 B.U. L. REv. 178, 178-79 (1950); Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, Com-
ment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation
and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 103, 110 (1985). The effect of the Colonial Ordi-
nance was confined to tidal water and great ponds and did not extend to rivers and streams
which were, at the time, considered reducible to private property. Id.
104. See Tannenbaum, supra note 103, at 110.
105. See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. (1 Tyng) 435, 438 (1810).
106. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 513-14 (Me. 1986) (discussing the
history of the Colonial Ordinance); Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227, 230-31, 77 A. 938, 939
(1910) (stating that the Colonial Ordinance was not merely an enactment, but a declaration of
existing claim rights); Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 447-48 (1882) (holding that the
Colonial Ordinance has full power throughout the state).
107. Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 A. 865 (1919).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 506, 106A at 869.
110. See, e.g., Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. at 449 (holding that the legislature has power
over public and common rights, concerning the taking of fish from bodies of water); Conant v.
Jordan, 107 Me. at 241 (holding that fishing and fowling are free in ponds greater than 10 acres).
11. See, e.g., Brastow v. Rockport Ice Co., 77 Me. 100, 103-04 (1885) (holding that the right
to ice-cut is free on ponds greater than 10 acres in size); Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 314
(1958) (holding that swimming and boating are obvious free uses of Maine's great ponds).
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Because the Colonial Ordinance makes no mention of public rights in the
state's non-tidal navigable rivers and streams, title to Maine's riverbeds has been
held to lie exclusively with private riparian proprietors. 112 In spite of this, the
strong demand for commercial use of the state's rivers, for log transport and navi-
gation, resulted in the development of a "public servitude of navigation" within
Maine common law. 113 This public easement does not place the public's right to
use rivers on the same level with that of great ponds or tidal waters, however. 114
Maine courts have consciously rejected broad interpretations of public rights in
rivers, choosing instead to create a strong distinction between tidal and non-tidal
flowing waters-the latter being no more than mere "highways." 115 The Maine
court did widen public rights slightly by including recreational boating within the
definition of navigation. 116 That exception aside, Maine law recognizes no public
right to any non-commercial use of the state's rivers.
Tidal waters and great ponds are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the
people1 17 while rivers are held by riparian proprietors subject to an easement held
by the public. 118 Regardless of this distinction, both the state and individual mem-
bers of the public may sue to enjoin others from interfering with public rights. 119
For this reason, public rights in navigable waters are an important consideration
for water resource management in the state because they create a responsibility on
the part of the state to preserve the public's interestsl 20 ; and, although the legisla-
ture has authority to extinguish public rights for public purposes, statutes that do
so are subject to heightened scrutiny. 12 1 Nonetheless, by modem standards, "the
jus publicum may be of trifling value" unless public rights extend somewhat fur-
ther than merely navigation and fishing. 12 2 The public must be entitled to the use
of healthy as well as unobstructed rivers before public water rights will be of any
use in preventing excessive diversion. Considering this, it becomes necessary that
112. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503,507, 106 A. 865 (1919) (holding that the
only limitation upon riparian proprietors in non-tidal rivers relates to passage of fish, and to a
lesser degree, boats and logs); Pearson v. Rolfe, 76 Me. 380, 385-86 (1884) (holding that a
riparian proprietor owns the bed of the river to the middle of a stream in a non-tidal and floatable
stream).
113. HARRIET HENRY & DAVID HALPERIN, MAINE LAW AFFECTING MARINE RESOURCES 222-24
(1970).
114. Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. at 507, 106 A. at 869 ("The only limitation upon the
absolute rights of riparian proprietors in non-tidal rivers and streams is the public right of pas-
sage for fish, and also for passage of boats and logs, provided the streams in their natural condi-
tion are of sufficient size to float boats or logs.") (emphasis added).
115. Veazie v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479, 483-84, 485 (1862) ("Though in many States of the
Union... the common law distinction between navigable [tidally influenced] rivers, and those
which are simply recognized as highways, does not exist; in this State, as has been seen, the
common law definition has been fully recognized.") (emphasis added).
116. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37,48-49,68 A. 527,531 (1907) (holding that
a navigable stream is subject to public use as a highway).
117. State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 79, 72 A. 875, 876 (1909) (holding that the state owns the
bed and the tidal waters themselves); Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. at 503.
118. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. at 47,68 A. at 531.
119. G. Graham Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 ME. L. REV. 161, 172-73 (1965)
(discussing the possibility of a court awarding injunctive relief to a private individual).
120. See, e.g., Brooks v. Cedarbrook, 82 Me. 17, 20-21 (1889) (discussing the sovereign
right of the state to improve rivers as public highways without giving compensation).
121. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 102 Me. 229, 232, 66A. 476, 477 (1906).
122. Dyer v. Curtis, 72 Me. 181, 186 (1881) (stating that "protecting the openness of navi-
gable waters" is an important principle).
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the Maine Supreme Judicial Court recognize the full range of public rights in Maine's
rivers to include ecological preservation.
Although public rights in Maine waters have typically favored commercial
uses, as demand for recreational use of the state's waters has grown, a body of
caselaw has emerged in which the Law Court has been urged to adopt a broader
view of the public's shared interest in Maine's rivers, lakes, and streams. These
cases may serve as an indication of the court's willingness for further judicial de-
velopment of public use rights.
In Gratto v. Palangi,123 the Law Court reiterated the guarantees found in the
Colonial Ordinance of "free fishing and fowling" on the great ponds and the public
use rights to swimming, pleasure boating, and skating. 124 The court in Smart v.
Aroostook Lumber Co.,125 extended the public servitude of navigation, previously
considered exclusive to commercial use of rivers, to recreational boating. 126 In its
decision the court stated:
The existing conditions which create the purposes of the public use of the Presque
Isle Stream are subject to change, and the driving and temporary storing of logs
now of principle importance, may become secondary in importance to the travel
of summer residents and the transportation of merchandise for their accommoda-
tion. In this State, recreation is assuming features and incidents as valuable to
the public as trade and manufacturing. 127
More recently, however, the court has moved in the other direction. In Bell v.
Town of Wells 12 8 (Bell I), the Law Court struck down the Maine Public Trust and
Intertidal Lands Act, a statute that declared modem recreational use of the inter-
tidal zone a public right. 129 In doing so, the court refused to update common law
use rights and limited the public's right to use the intertidal zone to those activities
specifically listed in the original Colonial Ordinance: fishing, fowling, and navi-
gation. 130 Further, the court considered legislative attempts to expand on public
rights in intertidal waters as an imposition of an easement for use by the general
public, and therefore, an unconstitutional taking. 131 This rationale casts its shadow
less on the state's great ponds, which are owned by the state according to common
law, and more on the rivers, which are owned privately just as the intertidal zone.
Bell II illustrates the court's reluctance to recast public rights in terms of contem-
porary modes of use. It is uncertain whether the court would consider the place-
ment of a negative easement upon rivers, which would restrict the exercise of ri-
parian water rights, as an imposition of an easement that "sharply differs in nature
and magnitude from the easement for ... navigation ... that the common law
alone reserved in favor of the public out of the fee [simple] ownership of..."
rivers. 132 Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Bell II was 4-3 decision with
123. 154 Me. 308, 147 A.2d 455 (1958).
124. Id. at 312, 147 A.2d at 458.
125. 103 Me. 37, 68 A. 527 (1907).
126. Id. at 48, 68 A. at 532.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter Bell II].
129. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 176-77 (holding that the Act facilitated unconstitutional taking
without compensation).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 176-77.
132. Id. at 177.
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dissenting Justice Wathen, who until recently served as Chief Justice, arguing
strongly for a broader interpretation of common law public use rights more in line
with public trust doctrine cases elsewhere in the country. 133
Even if Bell II does not foreclose public rights to ecologically sound river
habitat, it is important to note the limited usefulness of public rights in water re-
source management. To assess the effectiveness of public water rights as a check
on water withdrawal, it is useful to turn to cases that have arisen in other states that
have chosen to recognize a public right to expect riverine ecosystems to retain
their natural character.
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conserv. Comm'n 1 34
was the first decision to consider the legal potential of the public trust doctrine as
a check against water diversion. 135 The case arose out of a disputed application
for a water appropriation permit.136 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that the public trust doctrine acted as a limitation on the actions of the state regard-
ing water allocation. 137 The court reasoned that the doctrine's restraint on the
alienation of trust lands extended not merely to the submerged lands below the
disputed waters but to the waters themselves. 138 Substantively, however, the holding
required nothing more than the resource agency's consideration of the effect of
issuing permits in light of trust responsibilities: "[T]he Public Trust Doctrine re-
quires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential effect of the allocation of
water on the present water supply and future water needs of this State." 139
The Supreme Court of California went one step further in Nat'l Audubon Soc'y
v. Super. Ct. ofAlpine County.14 0 There, the court reviewed the validity of a water
use permit issued to the city of Los Angeles forty years previously, in the context
of the state's public trust duties. 14 1 The water permits in question authorized with-
drawals from the non-navigable streams that fed Mono Lake. 14 2 The lake, formed
from a volcanic caldera, is a unique ecosystem containing a number of endemic
species and serving as a nesting ground for migratory birds. 143 The challenged
permits authorized the appropriation of nearly the entire flow from the small streams
and resulted in tremendous ecological damage to the lake. 144
The court, in analyzing California's obligation to protect trust resources, held
that the duties of the state, as a fiduciary of the navigable waters, also included an
obligation to manage responsibly the non-navigable tributaries that feed the lake
as well. 145 This responsibility, the court reasoned, included an on-going duty to
consider the impact of water allocation decisions, not just initially at the time of
133. See id. at 191.
134. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
135. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Cons. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d at
460-61.
136. Id. at 458.
137. Id. at 460-61.
138. Id. at 461.
139. Id. at 462.
140. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert; denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
141. Id. at 712.
142. Id. at 711.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Ausness, supra note 89 at 424 (noting that the level of lake dropped 46 feet
over thirty years due to these heavy withdrawals).
145. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d at 720-21.
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granting permits. 14 6 Accordingly, the court found that the responsible state agency
had a duty to reexamine the permits in light of the trust duties imposed on it by the
doctrine. 1 4 7
More recently, in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conserv.
Bd., 14 8 the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the public trust doctrine in settling
a dispute involving instream flows and snowmaking. 149 There, the plaintiffs brought
suit against a state resource agency for allowing a "permanent relinquishment of a
public instream flow right. .. ." 150 The court found for the plaintiffs and held that
the state's agencies were bound by a "fiduciary duty" to maintain "'such waters of
natural streams and lakes as the [agencies] determine[] may be required for mini-
mum stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural lakes
to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.' ' 15 1 Unfortunately,
this language requires nothing more than serious consideration of ecological im-
pacts and did not prompt Colorado resource agencies to adopt more stringent flow-
age protections.
In Vermont, an attempt to halt increased pumping for snowmaking at the Okemo
and Sugarbush Ski Resorts by an environmental organization ended in failure when
the Vermont Environmental Board announced that the statutes it administered did
not authorize it to consider common law notions of public trust. 152
In all of the cases mentioned above, the public trust doctrine has been used as
a means of obtaining judicial review of agency decisionmaking; and in each case
the remedy merely required state resource agencies to take a "hard look" at their
decision-making process where trust waters were involved. 153 In other words, the
public trust remedies are process remedies, not substantive (allocative) remedies,
and cannot be relied upon to control water usage in the state.154
3. Statutory Modifications of the Common Law
The common law doctrines that govern water law in Maine do not form a
basis for systematic, quantitative allocations of water between competing uses;
they do not afford protection for a particular use as against another, and perhaps
more valuable uses. They do not reach to hydrologically connected resources such
as groundwater or diffused surface water. The state's legislature has been forced
to compensate for these faults and imperfections in the common law with statutory
and regulatory schemes. While the majority of action taken has been aimed at
146. Id. at 728.
147. Id. at 728-29.
148. 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995).
149. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Cons. Bd., 901 P.2d at 1251-55.
150. Id. at 1255.
151. Id. at 1256-57.
152. See, e.g., Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Note, Extending Public Trust Duties to Vermont's
Agencies: A Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L. REV.
509, 531-44 (1995) (asserting that recent Vermont decisions have misconstrued the common
law Public Trust Doctrine).
153. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 589-90 (1989)




issues of water quality, a number of these statutes do, though somewhat second-
arily, affect water quantity.
a. Maine Natural Resources Protection Act' 55
Section 480-C of the Maine National Resources Protection Act (NRPA) pro-
hibits "draining or otherwise dewatering" and "construction, repair or alteration of
any permanent structure" in, on, or over "any protected natural resource" without
first obtaining a permit from the DEP.156 The Act defines protected resources to
include "great ponds ... rivers, streams, or brooks." 157 Permits are to be granted
only where the applicant is able to demonstrate, among other things, that: (1) "[t]he
activity will not unreasonably harm any.., aquatic habitat, .. . freshwater, estua-
rine or marine fisheries or other aquatic life" 158 ; (2) "the activity will not unrea-
sonably interfere with the natural flow of any surface ... waters"1 59; or (3) "the
activity will not violate state water quality law, including those governing the clas-
sification of the State's waters." 160
Although, given the above, the NRPA would appear to govern consumptive
withdrawals for irrigation, there are two obstacles to bringing that practice within
its scope. The first is a technical detail. The term "dewatering" is not defined in
the NRPA, its accompanying regulations, or as a matter of law.16 1 The DEP has
stated that although the withdrawal of water from a watercourse might hypotheti-
cally amount to "dewatering," this interpretation does not include irrigation prac-
tices. 162 Likewise, the term "permanent structure" has been interpreted internally
by the DEP to exclude the equipment used for irrigation in the summer months. 163
Read together, these two policies completely exclude irrigation from the scope of
the NRPA.
The second obstacle is jurisdictional in nature. Section 480-V of the NRPA
provides that the permitting scheme applies "to all protected natural resources in
the State" except "[t]hose portions of ... great ponds, rivers, streams and brooks
within the jurisdiction of [the LURC]." 164 Thus, even if "dewatering" were to be
read in its ordinary meaning-the removal of water from a waterbody-the NRPA
permits would not be required for pumping operations in the unregulated territo-
ries where the problem is greatest. Rather, as the Act suggests, irrigators pumping
on unregulated lands would be subjected to the LURC's comprehensive land use
plan. 165
155. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-A-480-Z (West 2001).
156. Id. at § 480-C (emphasis added).
157. Id. at § 480-B(8). These waterbodies are defined in §§ 480-B(5), (9).
158. Id. at § 480-D(3).
159. Id. at § 480-D(4).
160. Id. at § 480-D(5).
161. Id. at § 480-B; see generally 06-096 CODE ME. R. § 305-1-45 (1999-2000).
162. Letter from Edward 0. Sullivan, DEP Commissioner, to Henry Nichols, Atlantic Salmon
Plan Coordinator 2 (Aug. 13, 1998).
163. Id. This assertion is arguable. Cranberries and blueberries require spraying not only in
the summer but during the winter as well. The pumping equipment that accomplishes this looks
anything but "temporary."
164. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-VCD(B) (West 2001).
165. Id. "The commission, in consultation with the department, shall periodically review
land use standards adopted by the commission.., to ensure that the standards afford a level of
protection consistent with the goals of [the NRPA]." Id.
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b. Maine Water Classification Program'66
As required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, the Clean
Water Act), 167 Maine has constructed a water classification scheme for the state's
surface and underground waters. This system of classifications is based upon "water
quality standards which designate the uses and related characteristics of those uses
for each class of water and which also establish water quality criteria necessary to
protect those uses and related characteristics." 168 The scheme divides the state's
fresh surface waters 169 and lakes and ponds 170 into Class AA, A, B, and C waters.
Each water classification is outlined in terms of certain minimum standards that
must be maintained by the DEP. 17 1 Where waters fall below their designated stan-
dards, those responsible for the decline are subject to a DEP enforcement action. 17 2
According to the scheme, Class AA waters are to be managed in such a way
that "[tihe aquatic life, dissolved oxygen and bacteria content.., shall be as natu-
rally occurs."17 3 Additionally, they must support a habitat that could be "charac-
terized as free flowing and natural."'174 Similarly, Class A waters must be support-
ive of a "natural" habitat such that aquatic life and bacteria content are "as natu-
rally occurs." 175 Even Class B waters require at a minimum that "habitat for fish
and other aquatic life... be characterized as unimpaired." 176
According to the statute, the phrase "as naturally occurs" means "conditions
with essentially the same physical, chemical and biological characteristics as found
in situations with similar habitats free of measurable effects of human activity." 177
The statute goes on to define "natural" as "living in, or as if in, a state of nature not
measurably affected by human activity." 17 8 Given these definitions, water quality
standards would appear to be violated, at least as far as Class AA and Class A
waters are concerned, wherever conditions in a river or stream are not pristine.
Current DEP regulations allow the agency to specify a minimum flow level
"necessary to maintain [the] applicable classification[].,, 179 No guidance is given
regarding how these levels should be set and, thus far, no minimum flows have
ever been required on any Maine river or stream. In place of setting such a mini-
mum level, the DEP has instituted an informal policy that allows waters to be
lowered to the so-called 7Q10 level.180 This policy shows no consideration for
either the natural hydrograph or the seasonal needs of the riverine ecosystem.
The lack of minimum flow standards, the informal policies of the DEP, and
the present situation in Downeast Maine (which could hardly be characterized as
pristine) collectively illustrate that the water classification program is not being
166. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 464-468 (West 2001).
167. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001).
168. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 464(1) (West 2001).
169. Id. § 465.
170. Id. § 465-A.
171. Id. § 451.
172. Id.
173. Id. § 465(1)(B) (emphasis added).
174. Id. § 465(1)(A).
175. Id. § 465(2)(B).
176. Id. § 465(3).
177. Id. § 466(2).
178. Id. § 466(9).
179. 06-096 CODE ME. R. § 581-2.
180. Defined as "the minimum seven day flow which occurs once in ten years." Id.
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implemented to its fullest. Yet, even at its strongest, the remedy provided by the
program (the enforcement action) is, like the remedy of riparian law, an after-the-
fact solution. The Water Classification Program is not a permit-based, command
and control management scheme like the other half of the Clean Water Act, the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 18 1 This means that
the DEP may enjoin activities as they degrade waters but not in anticipation of
their impacts. The possibilities of promulgating regulations under the WQS pro-
gram, and amending it, are discussed below.
c. The LURC Comprehensive Land Use Plan
According to its enabling statute, the LURC is required to enact a set of land
use regulations for the unregulated territories of the state. 182 The land use rules
promulgated by the LURC are required by statute to: (1) "[e]ncourage minimal
adverse impact of one use upon the use of surrounding areas by setting standards
of performance describing desirable and acceptable levels of operation"; (2)
"[rieflect a consideration of the availability and capability of the natural resources
base, including soils, topography or sufficient healthful water supplies"; and (3)
"[p]rotect and preserve significant natural, scenic and historic features ... ., 183
These standards have been incorporated into a comprehensive land use plan
that controls the occurrence of certain activities. 184 Depending upon which land
use district they occur in, the following activities may require a permit: (1) "agri-
cultural management activities"; (2) "activities affecting the natural flow of rivers
streams or brooks"; (3) "shoreland alteration"; (4) "water impoundment"; and (5)
"cranberry cultivation." 185 Permits may include terms that work to reduce the
impacts of the activities they authorize. 186 Although these activities would seem
to cover irrigation one way or another, only one LURC permit has ever been issued
limiting irrigation withdrawals. The fact that other irrigators within the unregu-
lated territories are not similarly permitted, means that the comprehensive land use
plan is either not being fully implemented, or does not have the necessary scope to
properly handle water withdrawal.
A comprehensive land use plan could provide an adequate framework for water
withdrawal regulation if it were truly comprehensive; but the LURC's control over
land use does not extend into regulated territories. Nor does the Comprehensive
Plan set quantitative minimum stream flow or lake levels, meaning that a permit's
substantive terms are left to the discretion of the agency.
d. Maine River Policy Act'87
The Maine Rivers Policy Act sets broad policy goals for the protection and
restoration of "outstanding" rivers. 188 This Act declares that no new permits will
181. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342-1346.
182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 685-A (West 2001).
183. Id.
184. 04-061 CODE ME. R. § 010-1-187.
185. Id. § 10.02 (1-139).
186. Id.
187. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 401-407 (West 2001).
188. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 403 (West 2001).
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be given for "any water diversion" project as that term is defined in the Maine
Waterway Development and Conservation Act (MWDCA). 189 Although the
Dennys, Pleasant, Machias, and Narraguagas Rivers all contain segments which
are protected by this Act, section 403 limits the term "water diversion project" to
mean only those diversions which are part of a "hydropower project." 190 Thus the
scope of the Rivers Policy Act is confined to new hydropower developments only.
e. Maine Water Transport Law9'
In 1987, the Maine Legislature declared, in enacting this statute, that: "the
transport of water for commercial purposes in large quantities away from its natu-
ral location constitutes a substantial threat to the health, safety and welfare of per-
sons who live in the vicinity of the water and rely on it for daily needs." 19 2 The
statute works by prohibiting, without a permit, the "transport [of] water for com-
meicial purposes by pipeline or other conduit or by tank truck or in a container,
greater in size than 10 gallons, beyond the boundaries of the municipality or town-
ship in which water is naturally located or any bordering municipality or town-
ship." 193 The law is inapplicable to irrigators, however, because it excludes water
transported for use in agricultural applications. 194 Even without the exception,
the law would only apply in those rare cases where irrigators pumped beyond the
confines of their neighboring township or municipality. 195
The overview of statutes presented above illustrates the piecemeal nature of
Maine's existing water law. The state's collection of single purpose water man-
agement laws does not connect to form a network of statutes offering the neces-
sary range of management tools needed for controlling rising demand for commer-
cial water use; they fail to address the relationships between different but interre-
lated resources such as surface water and groundwater. They embody no central
strategy for managing the state's most valuable resources. Water law in Maine
neither replaces nor supplements the outdated yet extant common law approaches
to water allocation, developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century and in-
tended to bolster the state's economy by promoting commercial use of Maine's
rivers and streams.
The ecological impacts of low instream flows have been felt in Maine, both in
the Downeastern and northern-most portions of the state. Recent events have shown
us that during periods of drought, Maine's flowing waters are drastically overbur-
dened by demand for water withdrawal. And yet, when periods of scarcity occur,
water literally leaks out through the holes in Maine's water legislation. It is cer-
tainly time to plug those holes.
189. Id.
190. Id.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 630-637 (West 2001).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2600, 2660-A (West 2001).
192. Id. § 2660.
193. Id. § 2660-A(1).
194. Id. § 2660-A(2)(B).
195. Id. § 2660-A(1). Yet another obstacle to applying this law may be present in the form of
the dormant commerce clause. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Maine, in 6 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 399-400 (Robert G. Beck ed., 1991).
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Ill. SHOULD MAINE ENACT WATER MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION?
A. Regulating Instream Flow Under the State's Water Quality Classification Statute
One possibility for regulating consumptive water use is to use the legislative
authority of the state's water quality classification scheme to promulgate mini-
mum stream flow regulations. In 1999, the DEP formulated a draft regulation
using this approach and entered into rulemaking. 19 6 In the face of pressure from
the agricultural industry and the governor, however, the agency recently withdrew
the draft regulation. 197 As it is likely that this regulatory approach will be consid-
ered again as the state reevaluates the need to control water consumption in the
future, it is worthwhile to discuss its merits.
As required by the Clean Water Act, 19 8 Maine has enacted comprehensive
water quality standards for all of its intrastate waters. 19 9 Water quality standards
are specific to particular classes of waterbodies and involve two elements: (1)
designated uses of a body of water; and (2) numerical and narrative criteria to
protect those uses. 200 Though the Clean Water Act was intended to prevent "dis-
charges" of pollution into the nation's waters, 20 1 it has been established that a state
may require compliance with minimum stream flow conditions in order to protect
the designated uses of a water way.202 The DEP's now withdrawn draft minimum
flow regulation relied on this interpretation of the Clean Water Act to establish a
framework that defined water quality for both rivers and ponds by setting forth
minimum stream flow and lake level requirements. 203
In order to maintain instream flow, the regulation established a numerical cri-
terion known as Aquatic Base Flow (ABF). 2° 4 The ABF is the minimum accept-
able discharge per unit area of drainage basin 205 for a given seasonal period.
20 6 It
is calculated from the median of low flows in a watershed or portion of watershed
for a specific period of time, such as seven days. Where "adequate flow records"
did not exist for a watershed, the regulation resorted to the instream flow sug-
gested by the USFWS in its Interim Regional Policy for New England Stream
Flow.20 7
196. MRA-57 DEP p. 9. Maine Regulations Agenda, September 24, 1999.
197. Susan Young, Federal Fish Fracas Continues Over Irrigation Policy Debate, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (July 20, 2000).
198. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A) (1994).
199. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 §§ 464-470 (West 2001).
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A), (B).
201. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
202. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wa. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719
(1994).
203. 06-096 CODE ME. R. § 581(2).
204. Working draft of 06-096 CODE ME. R. § 581(5) (Mar. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Working
draft].
205. This unit is known as cfsm (cubic feet per second per square mile of drainage area).
206. ABF values are assigned to four seasonal periods: July to September; September to
March; March to May; and May to June. This allows minimum flow standards to mimic the
natural hydrograph.
207. See VERNON LANG, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW
ENGLAND FLOW POLICY, app. A (May 11, 1999).
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A drainage area feeding a Class AA river segment was considered a "Class AA
watershed., 20 8 The rule limited the total amount of consumptive withdrawals
within Class AA watersheds (to less than 0.4 cfsm) and additionally prohibited any
withdrawals that would lower instream flows below a specified threshold (4.0
cfsm). 209 Consumptive withdrawals from Class A waters outside of Class AA
watersheds were to be increasingly restricted as instream flows decreased and ap-
proached ABF, and prohibited when instream flow fell below ABF.2 10 Withdraw-
als from Class B and C waters outside of Class AA watersheds were simply pro-
hibited when instream flow fell below ABF. 2 11
The draft rule handled withdrawals from lakes and ponds in a similar fashion.
It set forth "natural seasonal low water levels" which represented the maximum
allowable level below a lake's normal high water line.2 12 Water withdrawals were
strictly prohibited where they would: (1) result in lowering lake water levels be-
low the natural seasonal low water level; or (2) cause any outlet of the lake to fall
below its ABF. 2 13
Although the DEP's rule should be commended for attempting to preserve
natural flow characteristics, it is an inadequate way of controlling water withdrawal.
Its essential failing is that it does not identify current users, assess their withdrawal
levels and allocate specific quantities of water to them. When periods of scarcity
arise water users will have no way of knowing how to comply with the minimum
flow standards because there is no quantitative measure of how much they are
contributing to the problem. Additionally, there is no prospective means for ensur-
ing compliance with the flow standards contained in the rule because the only
enforcement mechanism would be an after-the-fact water quality enforcement ac-
tion.2 14 In other words, just like the riparian scheme it is meant to replace, this
regulatory method does nothing to avert a tragedy of the commons during dry
periods because it offers users no assurances that their competitors are not with-
drawing more than their fair share.
If it is accepted that what is lacking is a method for allocating specific quanti-
ties of allowed withdrawal among identified users, the state's water quality legis-
lation contains no authority to fill this regulatory gap. Regulations that exceed the
rulemaking authority of an agency are subject to judicial review and invalidation
under the Maine Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA). 2 15 Additionally, the
Law Court has invalidated agency rules using the non-delegation doctrine2 16 where
208. Working draft at (5)(A).
209. Id. at (5)(A)(1), (2).
210. Id. at (5)(B)(1).
211. Id. at (5)(C).
212. Id. at (l)(F).
213. Id.
214. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 451 (2001).
215. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8058 (1989); see also Martin v. Comm'r of DHS, Kenn.
Dkt. No. CV-94-260 (April 4th, 1996) (Maine DHS exceeded its rulemaking authority with
overbroad definition of "abuse"); M.H.C.F.C v. Henrietta Goodall Hosp., Kenn. Dkt, No. CV-
96-24 (Sept. 11, 1996) (MHCFC exceeded legislative mandate by requiring more information
from patients then allowed by statute).
216. This doctrine charges that the delegation of legislative power to executive agencies
violates the principle of separation of powers, except where there are legislatively defined "pri-
mary standards" specific enough to prevent abuses of agency discretion. Although the doctrine
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rules extend, modify, or conflict with statutory authorization. 2 17 The grant of
rulemaking authority contained in the water quality classification system simply
does not contemplate the formation of a permit-based system for allocating water
rights among multiple water users across the state.2 18 Regulation alone will not be
able to control consumptive water use in Maine.
B. The Legislative Solution: Regulated Riparianism
A more comprehensive, flexible and prospective approach to stream flow than
that found in the water classification act is needed. The WQS program must be
amended, or independent water management laws enacted, that are tailored to the
particular resource issues facing Maine today, and adaptable to those conflicts that
are fast developing.
1. Water Allocation Law in the Northeast:
Water Management Policies "From Away"
As early as the 1950s eastern states began replacing their riparian common
law with statutes requiring permits for certain water uses. 2 19 Currently, partial
regulatory systems now exist in nearly every eastern state.220 The primary impe-
tus behind the development of these programs was the failure of riparianism to
balance the exercise of private water rights with their impacts on the environment
during times of shortage.2 2 1 Across the east, systems of water management have
evolved with surprising particularity due to the wide variety of demand, patterns
of development and ecological characteristics from state to state. They form a broad
spectrum, ranging from extremely focused ad hoc legislation targeting a single
practice to comprehensive water allocations systems that regulate nearly every
aspect of water usage. 222 The term "regulated riparianism" is used for these modi-
was originally used to strike down legislation, it has been used to invalidate regulations as well.
In both City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398-403 (Me. 1973) and
Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 795-800 (Me. 1974), the Law Court in-
voked the non-delegation doctrine to nullify an administrative action while leaving the statutory
scheme in tact.
217. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Walton, 135 Me. 57, 67-68 190 A. 297, 302 (1937) ("[The
agency's] power to make rules and regulations extends only to such details of administration as
are necessary to carry out and enforce the mandate of the legislature.... [Agencies may not
engage in] flagrant usurpation[s] of [a] prerogative which belongs to the legislature."); Me. Sch.
Admin. Dist. No. 15 v. Raynolds, 413 A.2d 523, 529 (Me. 1980) ("[T]here [must] be sufficient
standards-specific or generalized, explicit or implicit to guide the agency in its exercise of
authority ... so that (1) regulation can proceed in accordance with basic policy determinations
made by those who represent the electorate and (2) some safeguard is provided to assist in
preventing arbitrariness in the exercise of power."); State v. Dube, 409 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Me.
1979) ("The agency must be given clear standards to prevent the exercise of authority beyond
the scope intended by the legislature and to assure that the citizen is protected against arbitrary
or discriminatory action .... ); Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167,170 (Me. 1974)
(a rule is only valid where the legislature has authorized its promulgation.).
218. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 464(5) (West 2001).
219. 1 Beck, supra note 60 at 444.
220. See id. at 445 (collecting citations).
221. See e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36
WAYNE L. REV. 93, 93 (1989).
222. Am. Soc. of Civ. Eng'r., THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE at V (Joseph
Dellapenna, ed., 1997) [hereinafter RRMWC].
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fications of common law water rights. 223 In facing the need to draft new water
law in the State, Maine need not reinvent the wheel. Because of their hydrological
similarity to Maine, the water management laws of some of the New England and
North Atlantic states contain a number of regulatory components that may be adapted
for use at home. These are discussed below.
a. Vermont
Stream flow regulation in Vermont developed primarily in response to the
effects of artificial snowmaking and the demands for community water supplies.
Snowmaking, in particular, has been the source of fierce battles between environ-
mental organizations seeking to protect the state's freshwater ecosystems and one
of the largest and most valuable industries in Vermont.2 24 Environmental advo-
cates pressured the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to draft a fully
comprehensive water withdrawal regulation. 225 Their efforts led to a negotiated
rulemaking process that failed to produce a consensus. Shortly after the break-
down of the negotiation process in 1994, the ANR adopted an interim procedure
that addressed only withdrawals for snowmaking. 226 Two years later this proce-
dure was promulgated as a regulation.
The regulation adopted by the ANR operates by specifying terms to be incor-
porated into a statutorily required stream flow alteration permit. This form of
permit was initially intended to address flow modification from hydroelectric dams
and gravel mining. 227 According to the permitting statute: "A person shall not
change, alter or modify the course, current or cross section of any watercourse
with a drainage area of greater than ten square miles at the location of the proposed
change .. ..- 228 Permits to do any of these things may be granted where an inves-
tigation concludes that there will be no significant damage to fish or wildlife. 229
The permitting statute exempts "accepted agricultural ... practices," effectively
limiting only those water withdrawals from artificial snowmaking. 230
The regulation's role is to define the parameters of the stream flow alteration
permit by specifying a conservation flow defined as the February Median Flow
(FMF).2 3 1 New users are required to perform a hydrological study describing
their needs, water availability, and any alternatives to their proposed flow alter-
ation. Where permits are approved, withdrawals are limited to 50% of the FMF
plus any portion of flow in excess of 1.4 cfsm during the months of October and
November, or 1.1 cfsm from December to March. 232 The rule exempts any with-
223. See Joseph Dellapenna, Eastern Water Law: Regulated Riparianism Replaces Riparian
Rights, in THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW MANUAL 317, 323 (Richard Fink ed., 1995).
224. Joseph S. McLean, Comment, Streamflow Policy in Vermont: Managing Conflicting
Demands on the State's Waters, 19 VT. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (1994).
225. Interview with Ken Womack, Vice President, Maine Chapter of The Nature Conser-
vancy, in Brunswick, ME (July 6, 1999).
226. VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
(SUPPLEMENT To RULES ON WATER WITHDRAWAL FOR SNOWMAKING) (Mar. 22, 1996).
227. See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 1001-1032 (Lexis 1998 & Supp. 2001) (outlining
permit requirements, public purpose and policy on water withdrawal for snowmaking).
228. Id. § 1021(a).
229. Id. § 1023(a)(2).
230. Id. § 1021(f).
231. VT. CODE R. § 16-03(2), (3). The FMF is site specific where there is adequate data to
calculate it, otherwise a state-wide average is used (0.8 cfsm).
232. Id. § 16-06(2)(a),(b).
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drawal system pumping under a de minimis level (0.005 cfsm), and recognizes the
aggregate effect of many such systems as a single withdrawal. 2 33 Withdrawal
systems that pre-date the regulation fall within its scope as they expand or within a
period of four years after the promulgation of the rule. 234
The essential features of this withdrawal regulation are: (1) a narrow scope
including a single class of users; (2) applicability only to new users, with existing
users phased in after a delay period elapses; (3) a threshold use level, or de minimis
exception; (4) an ABF; and (5) a system for studying and recording hydrological
data. 235
b. New Hampshire
Hydroelectric dams, industrial manufacturing, snowmaking, agriculture and
municipal water supply systems are the principal sources of stream flow alteration
in New Hampshire. 236 The aggregate effect of so many different consumptive
uses prompted the New Hampshire Legislature to enact the New Hampshire Riv-
ers Management and Protection Program (RMPP).2 37 Although this statute autho-
rized stream flow regulations over 11 years ago, New Hampshire's Department of
Environmental Services (DES) only began drafting regulations in 1999. The DES's
proposed rule is currently in the notice and comment phase of public participation,
and is expected to be promulgated within the year.238
The RMPP allows the state government to designate "significant river seg-
ments."'239 The statute authorizes the DES to adopt rules "specifying the stan-
dards, criteria, and procedures by which protected instream flow shall be estab-
lished and enforced for each" of the various classes of protected river segments. 240
The protected instream flows that are established shall "be maintained at all times,
except when inflow is less than the protected instream flow level as a result of
natural causes. '24 1 Furthermore, "the maintenance of protected instream flows
shall constitute a condition of any permit issued by the [DES] for any project or
activity within [a protected segment]." 242
Relying on this statutory authority, the DES has drafted instream flow rules
that apply to consumptive withdrawals of both surface water and groundwater
(within 250 feet of the river segment's boundaries) 243 ; as well as the management
233. Id. § 16-06(5).
234. Id. § 16-08. (This means that all systems should theoretically have submitted their
studies by July, 2000. The regulation does not specify whether existing systems with with-
drawal levels in excess of those allowed by its terms will be acceptable after this date.)
235. Id. § 16-03-08.
236. See Robert Braile, State Readies Regulation on River Flow, THE BOsroN GLOBE, Apr. 11,
1999.
237. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483:1 to :15 (2001).
238. See DES, Revised Draft Instream Flow Rules (visited May 25, 1999) available at <http:/
/www.state.nh.us/des/rivers/ instream/drftnotc.htm>.
239. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483:6, 7 (2001).
240. Id. § 483:9-c(1). The actual grant of rulemaking authority is found at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 483:11 (IV).
241. id. § 483:9-c (IV).
242. Id. § 483:9-c (V).
243. DES, Annotated Draft Instream Flow Rules, Env-C 720.02(a)(1)-(2) (June 10, 2000)
available at <http://www.des.state.nh.us/rivers/instream/archive/form2/form%20annotated%20
rules.doc (last visited Feb. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Draft Instream Flow Rules].
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practices of some hydroelectric energy facilities. 244 According to the draft rules, a
use of water is consumptive, and thus within the scope of regulation, if: "(1) The
return water flow is less than that withdrawn; (2) The water is returned to a loca-
tion greater than 500 feet from the withdrawal location; or (3) The water is re-
turned at a different time from the withdrawal. 24 5
Under the draft regulation, the total amount of flow available for appropria-
tion by affected users at any given moment is determined by the "trigger flow."' 246
There are three different trigger flows specified by the rule: Phase I, II and 111.247
A phase I flow corresponds with the "seasonal Q60, ' '24 8 or "the average daily river
flow which is equaled or exceeded 60 percent of the time." 24 9 Similarly, a phase II
flow is based on the Q80 250 ; and a phase III, the Q90. 25 1 In order to account for
seasonal variations the trigger flows are then divided up again: Summer (June to
October); Autumn (November and December); Winter/Northem (January to March);
Winter/Southern (January and February); Spring/Northern (April and May); and
Spring/Southern (March to May). 25 2 Using this system, a Phase I, II, and III trig-
ger flow is determined for the Summer, Autumn, Winter and Spring for each of the
110 watersheds in the state.25 3
The regulation would then give the DES the power to limit withdrawals in a
variety of situations: (1) when the average daily flow falls below the phase I trig-
ger flow for seven consecutive days, the total watershed-wide consumptive with-
drawal is limited; (2) when stream flow falls below the phase II flow for more than
seven days, withdrawal must be limited somewhat more sharply; (3) where instream
flow falls below the phase III flow for more the seven days the DES must order all
affected users to cease all "consumptive uses"; and finally (4) Commissioner, with
certification from the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department, must order
withdrawals ceased wherever he finds that significant adverse impacts will occur
to aquatic life.2 54
Existing users are registered, rather than permitted, under this scheme. In the
ordinary course of events, a registered user is allowed to continue withdrawing as
much water as he always has. An order limiting consumptive water use, however,
results in a reduction of the water available to each user proportionate to the amount
of water that user has been withdrawing historically, according to records of his
usage from the past two years. 255 Thus this system has been referred to as imple-
244. Id. at Env-C 720-02(a)(3). This last inclusion only applies to dams that do not store
water for "peak" periods, id., and excludes those dams which are operating under a FERC li-
cense at the time of promulgation, and those with minimum flow provisions in FERC licenses.
Id. at 720.02(b), (c).
245. Id. at Env-C 720-03(a).
246. See id. at Env-C 722.01(c).
247. Id.
248. Id. at Env-C 723.04(a)(1).
249. Id. at Env-C 721.09. The number following the "Q" corresponds with the percentage of
time the average daily flow is equaled or exceeded. Id. at Env-C 721.10 ("QS0"), 721.11 ("Q90").
250. Id. at Env-C 723.04(a)(2).
251. Id. at Env-C 723.04(a)(3).
252. Id. at Env-C 723.02(a)(1)-(6).
253. Id. at Env-C 723.02-04.
254. Id. at Env-C 722.02.
255. Id. at Env-C 722.06.
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menting a "share the pain" approach to water shortage.256 Finally, as new users
come on the scene, the DES must decide how much additional water to allocate to
them, on a case by case basis.
This water management system is characterized by: (1) a wide scope, inclu-
sive of all consumptive water uses; (2) application only to special areas (protected
river segments); (3) a watershed specific, seasonally varied ABF; and (4) an incre-
mental response to periods of shortage.
c. Massachusetts
In 1985, Massachusetts responded to the intense pressure on its water resources,
due in large part to cranberry cultivation, by enacting the Water Management Act.
The Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) subsequently promulgated
and implemented regulations. 257 This regulatory system applies to anyone with-
drawing over 100,000 gallons of water per day from any "water source," including
groundwater.258
The program treats new and existing users differently.2 59 An existing with-
drawal, one with records extending back five years, may be registered with the
MDEP, which has some limited power to place conditions on the registrant's with-
drawal. 260 Existing withdrawals may then be re-registered every ten years, unless
they lapse through non-use, in which case they lose their registration status and
must be permitted.2 6 1 Under this scheme, all of the withdrawals existing at the
time the regulations came into effect are preserved.
The real impact of the system is on new users, who are required to obtain
permits. The MDEP must calculate a "safe yield" for each water source, be it an
aquifer, river or lake. 262 This figure represents the total amount of water that is
available for withdrawal within a particular source. The safe yield for rivers must
be protective of a minimum stream flow, although how this minimum flow is to be
determined is not defined. 26 3 If, after consulting a laundry list of public interest
factors, the agency decides that a permit applicant's proposed withdrawal will not
adversely affect the minimum flow, they may issue a permit specifying the level,
peak and allowable period(s) of withdrawal, and permit duration (not to exceed 20
years). 26 4
By strictly controlling new users, the effect of the system is to "put on the
brakes." Those looking to pump from a source with a safe yield that is completely
allocated are not without hope, however. New users may obtain restrictive ease-
ments from registered or permitted users, limiting their withdrawals and freeing
up some of the safe yield. Additionally, permitted and registered withdrawals are
transferable in whole or in part.26 5
256. Interview with Ken Womack, Vice President, Maine Chapter of The Nature Conser-
vancy, in Brunswick, ME (July 6, 1999).
257. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (West 1994); MASS. REos. CODE tit. 310, §§ 36.01-.44
(2001).
258. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21G, § 4 (1994); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 36.03 (2001).
259. Compare MASS. REDS. CODE tit. 310, § 36.04 with § 36.17.
260. Id. § 36.04.
261. Id. § 36.10.
262. Id. § 36.31.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 36.27.
265. Id. §§ 36.09, 36.36.
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In times of scarcity, the MDEP may declare a "state of water emergency"
which authorizes restrictions in withdrawal levels and institutes withdrawal priori-
ties and conservation measures.
In short, the notable components of the Massachusetts Water Management
Act are: (1) a threshold use level; (2) a means for dealing with a single user who is
collectively pumping more than the threshold amount from several exempted with-
drawals; (3) application to surface and groundwater; (4) a system for registering
existing uses at their existing levels; (5) a permit requirement for new users; (6) a
permit duration of 10 to 20 years; (7) an ABF level and allocation methodology;
(8) permit transferability; and (9) a response to periods of shortage.
d. Connecticut
Connecticut's Water Diversion Policy Act, enacted in 1982, closely resembles
the Massachusetts Water Management Act described above.266 Connecticut's regu-
latory scheme applies to anyone withdrawing more than 50,000 gallons of surface
or groundwater during a twenty-four-hour period; collecting discharge run-off within
a watershed of more than 100 acres; or conducting an interbasin transfer of more
than 50,000 gallons in one day.267 There are more than eight exemptions exclud-
ing various different activities and classes of users from the scope of the Act.268
Similar to the Water Management Act of Massachusetts, those who were ac-
tively withdrawing water prior to the enactment of the statute are required to reg-
ister their usage within a certain period of time, or else be subjected to a permitting
process. 269 New users within the scope of the Act are required to submit a de-
scription of their proposed withdrawal along with an alternatives analysis. 270 The
regulations are silent, however, on how water is to be allocated in a fashion that
protects specific instream flows.
As in Massachusetts, permitted and registered withdrawals are transferable.27 1
Finally, the Act provides for response to periods of shortage through the declara-
tion of an emergency state, which allows the agency administering the Act to alter
for periods of thirty days the terms of permits. 272
The Act, and its implementing regulations, may be broken down into the fol-
lowing components: (1) a threshold use level; (2) numerous exempted activities
and classes of users; (3) application to both ground and surface water; (4) a system
for protecting the rights of pre-existing users; (5) a permitting scheme for new
users; (6) a permit duration of 25 years - usually limited to 5 years; (7) a fee for
withdrawal; (8) permit transferability; and (9) a response to emergency water short-
ages.
e. Delaware
The Delaware Environmental Protection Act (DEPA) 27 3 provides that: "No
266. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-365-378 (West 1995).
267. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-377.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 22a-368.
270. Id. § 369.
271. Id. § 368.
272. Id. § 378.
273. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6077 (2000) (implemented by Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) Regulations Governing the Allocation of Wa-
ter §§ 1.01-5.06 [hereinafter Allocation Reg.]).
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person shall, without first having obtained a permit from the Secretary [of the
Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC)], un-
dertake any activity: ... [i]n a way which may cause or contribute to withdrawal
of ground water or surface water or both.- 274 The regulatory scheme implement-
ing the Act applies this mandate to anyone withdrawing over 50,000 gallons within
twenty-four hours.2 75 New and existing users are subjected to the same permit-
ting scheme.276 Withdrawal limitations are established by reference to a number
of qualitative factors, rather than a defined value such as an ABF.27 7 Permits are
conditioned on a number of obligations such as: (1) maintenance of a monitoring
and record keeping system; (2) development of a leak response strategy; (3) imple-
mentation of best management practices; and (4) development of a water conser-
vation program.2 78 An allocation permit is issued for thirty years and is transfer-
able. 279
The lack of minimum flow standards reflects the focus of the DEPA on ensur-
ing an adequate drinking water supply rather than ensuring ecological health.
The important elements of this system are: (1) a broad scope covering all uses
and all waters; (2) a threshold use level; (3) requirements that apply evenly to both
new and existing users; and (4) a system for making allocation decisions based on
qualitative factors.
f Virginia
Although not a northeastern state, Virginia's water allocation system offers an
interesting solution for dealing with small areas that have chronic water manage-
ment problems.2 80 Virginia's Surface Water Management Act 28 1 and associated
regulations, 282 authorize the State Water Control Board (SWCB) to establish "sur-
face water management areas" throughout the state. For each area the SWCB
establishes a low water flow level. 2 83 When stream discharge falls below this
triggering flow, conservation plans are activated which limit the consumptive wa-
ter use of those permitted under the Act.284 The Act exempts those who withdraw
less than 300,000 gallons of water per month or whose withdrawals were in exist-
ence before the statute unless they have increased or lapsed.2 85
The essential characteristics of this program are: (1) application to surface
water only; (2) a threshold use level; (3) applicability only to specified manage-
ment areas; (4) "grandfathering" of existing uses; (4) a permit requirement for new
274. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6003(a)(3) (1991).
275. Allocation Reg. §1.03.
276. Id.
277. This system is still very close to traditional riparianism, as may be seen in its attempt to
codify "reasonableness," or, at least, the analysis of reasonableness.
278. Allocation Reg. § 4.03.
279. Id. §§ 5.01, 5.04.
280. A similar solution is found in the North Carolina Water Use Act, which makes use of
"capacity use areas" in the same way the Virginia Act uses "surface water management areas."
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11-215.221 (1999); VA. CODEANN. §§ 62.1-242-253 (Michie 2001).
281. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242-253 (Michie 2001).
282. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-220-100-220-330 (West 2002).
283. Id. § 25-220-100.
284. Id.
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-243.27.
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users; (5) a permit duration of 10 years; (6) transferable permits; (7) a trigger flow
initiating conservation provisions; and (8) an ABE
2. The Anatomy of a Water Withdrawal Permit System: A Legislative Suggestion
Dissecting the water management laws outlined above and assembling those
features most suitable for use in Maine, yields a list of provisions that should be
considered in drafting a future water allocation law for the State.
Common law water rights are fragmented by resource classification: ground-
water, diffuse surface water, standing surface water, navigable running waters and
non-navigable running waters. The disparate treatment of these classes of water
ignores the hydrological connections between them. There are strong arguments
for integrating the management of all of the water resources of the state.2 86 As has
been noted of Maine: "[The] treatment of surface and groundwater under incom-
patible legal doctrines, can stifle efforts to manage either type."287 Many states
recognized this problem and have integrated ground and surface water manage-
ment.28 8 Florida has also added diffuse surface water-runoff such as storm wa-
ter-to its program as well.2 89 Conjunctive or integrated management systems
prevent users from shifting sources to evade regulation and ensure an effective
response to water conservation during times of shortage.
A shift from surface to groundwater consumption has been proposed as a so-
lution to the impacts of water withdrawal. 290 Although this tactic may prove ben-
eficial to a certain extent, groundwater is hydrologically connected to surface wa-
ter and over extraction will ultimately lead to the same ecological problems caused
by surface water extraction. The proposed shift has important ramifications in
view of the fact that use of ground and surface water are legally distinct under
Maine law. Groundwater extraction is not subject to reasonable use requirements,
except to the extent that it may not interfere with drinking water supplies. 29 1 Like
many of those states reviewed above, Maine's water management system must
integrate the management of ground and surface water.
Management scope may be defined geographically as well as by resource clas-
sification. Regions that consistently experience shortages may be targeted for use
restrictions. 292 This method is useful in controlling hot spots. At first glance,
regional targeting may appear useful for solving the problems in Maine's
Downeastem region. Water management issues in Maine are not limited merely to
286. See DAwsoN, supra note 85, at 18; Sherk, supra note 4, at 292. See also Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code [hereinafter RRMWC] §§ IR-l-15, 9R-2-01-05.
287. See DAWSON, supra note 85, at 18.
288. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.403-373.466 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-367,
368 (West 1995); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7 § 6003 (1996 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-18-3-
1 repealed (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B (West 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.120,
151.150 (Michie 1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21G, §§ 1 to 19 (West 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 103F, 103G (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-4A-2 repealed (Supp.
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.21 (1999).
289. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(16) (West 2000).
290. Mary Anne Clancy, King Pledges His Support For Blueberry Irrigation, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (July 31, 1999).
291. See Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175, 188 (1873); Delogu supra note 195.
292. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1 to 62.247 (Michie 2001). ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-3-




the Downeastern region of the State, however. As other forms of agriculture ex-
pand, additional consumptive uses such as snowmaking and industrial manufac-
turing grow, and municipal demands continue to increase, the state will soon be
faced with an apportionment dilemma that is statewide. Additionally, such schemes
are inflexible as they require fresh legislative or regulatory action to declare and
develop management programs for new regions. This impedes the state's ability
to respond to new resource conflicts as they form.
Another means of limiting management scope is to limit regulatory protec-
tions to specific river segments, lakes or aquifers. This approach allows the state
to avoid regulating where it deems ecological considerations outweighed by the
need for economic development. This method has, however, opened the door to
contentious political battles over the classification of state waters in New Hamp-
shire, where local governments have a large part of the responsibility for classify-
ing their waters. 293 It is possible, and preferable, to avoid this situation by reach-
ing all surface waters. In this way, the agencies charged with water management
may reach all problem areas and still retain discretion to relax restrictions where
necessary by adjusting minimum flow standards. Any scheme Maine adopts should
provide for statewide coverage of surface and groundwater.
a. Scope of Uses Covered
Programs may be tailored to meet regional problems by limiting their applica-
tion in terms of type and extent of use. Most regulated riparian states exclude
withdrawals of water below a threshold level from the requirements of the permit-
ting process (Massachusetts-100,000 gpd, lowered if the water supply is threat-
ened; Connecticut and Delaware-less than 50,000 gpd; Virginia-10,000 gpd.294
De minimis exceptions are subject to abuse, and statutes containing them must
incorporate a provision that prohibits the accumulation of many exempted with-
drawals by one user. Even with such a provision, threshold levels may result in
cumulative effects.
Maine should strike the balance between an overbroad, and burdensome, regu-
.latory system and one that is subject to abuse, by adopting a small de minimis
exception expressed in terms of feet 3/ml 2 of watershed and not gallons/day. Addi-
tionally, threshold use levels should vary from watershed to watershed depending
upon demand and hydrological features.
Frequently permit programs exclude whole classes of uses: livestock water-
ing, certain forms of agriculture, domestic uses, public utilities, water for fire emer-
gencies, and municipal or public water supply.29 5 Alternatively, a permit scheme
can single out certain uses for regulation, such as Vermont's snowmaking rule. In
many states, exemptions result from political rather than practical considerations. 29 6
Courts in some jurisdictions have prevented the exemptions from swallowing the
regulation by avoiding a finding of statutory preemption and allowing common
293. See Robert Braile, Ski Areas' Agreement on Ecology Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June
25, 2000, available at 2000 WL3332569.
294. Sherk, supra note 4 at 299-300. Florida, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Michigan all have a 100,000 gpd thresh-
old use level. Sherk, supra note 5, at 298 n.58.
295. 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 9.03(a)(3), 458-460.
296. TARLOCK, supra note 58, at § 3.96 (citing Ky. REV. STAT. § 151.120, which exempts




law principles to operate through gaps in the water law.2 97 Inevitably, allowing
any class of users to be excluded from the operation of a water management sys-
tem opens the door to abuse and ad hoc amendments. The only exception worthy
of such consideration is withdrawal by municipalities for drinking water supplies.
Yet even municipal drinking water withdrawals should be required to comply with
the reporting and data keeping provisions of a regulated riparian statute. 298
As demand for consumption has risen, many states have limited access to
water resources based on the nature and importance of a proposed use. The most
basic form of this measure is the requirement that all consumptive water usage be
"beneficial. '299 The beneficial use standard is generally so easy to meet that it is
effectively useless as a screen. This has led some states to list classes of uses that
are per se beneficial and then prioritize these uses-with municipal drinking water
supply generally heading the list. The approach is useful where the level of de-
mand is such that different types of uses are struggling against one another.
b. Mechanisms for Maintaining Instream Flows
There are generally three stages involved in setting instream flow restrictions:
(1) setting the optimum flows to be maintained; (2) allocating the waters in excess
of this optimum flow; and (3) developing a response to periods of low flow.
In the first stage, regulators find a basis, such as an historical average or an
ecological study, for setting a quantitative optimum stream flow (Aquatic Base
Flow, ABF). Seasonal variation in the natural flow regime is essential to the
functioning of freshwater ecosystems. Accordingly, the ABF must vary season-
ally in a way that mimics the natural flow regime. Seasonal variations may them-
selves vary geographically. New Hampshire's proposed regulatory system takes
this dimension into account by setting different seasonal variations for different
regions of the state. 300 Variations in geology, soil composition, microclimate, and
vegetative cover make all hydrological units unique. For this reason, ABF should
also vary by watershed, as reviewed above in the programs of Vermont, New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts. 30 1
Waters that flow in excess of a watershed's ABF are available for allocation. 302
This quantity is often termed the "safe yield." Allocation is usually made by al-
lowing existing users to continue using (at least a portion) what they have always
used, and then dispersing the remaining water among new users in accordance
with the reasonableness of, and benefits associated with, their proposed use.303
297. Wisconsin v. Zawistowski, 290 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. 1980) (holding that even though
water withdrawal for cranberry cultivation was exempted from regulation, the use was still sub-
ject to reasonable use limitations).
298. See RRMWC §§ 6R-1-06, 7R-3-05.
299. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(4)(a) (West 2000).
300. Spring and winter are defined differently for the northern and southern parts of the state.
301. The alternative to calculating this huge matrix of base flows is to set a statewide or
regional ABF, such as the one suggested by the USFWS in its Interim Regional Policy for New
England Stream Flow Recommendations.
302. See supra Part Ill. B.l.c (material regarding Massachusetts' Water Management Act).
303. Compare supra Part III.B.l.e (materials concerning Delaware) with Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 373.016(4)(a) (West 2000) (decisions regarding the issuance of permits to new users
depend on a determination of whether the use is a "reasonable-beneficial" use) and Minnesota,




Yearly variations in climate and precipitation will eventually bring periods of
scarcity and reduced safe yields. For this reason any water withdrawal system
must find some way to account for periods of drought where flows fall below ABE
The programs of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware, are examples of one
approach to dealing with resource scarcity: the creation of a state of emergency in
which unspecified restrictions are imposed upon consumptive users. These states
give total discretion to the agency to limit water use. A more sophisticated method
to deal with low flow periods has been proposed in New Hampshire's "share the
pain" provision, which provides for an incremental response to varying degrees of
drought, by proportionately decreasing the withdrawal level by each user. A simi-
lar program involving pro rata reductions is used in Alabama. 304 New Hampshire's
proposed regulations would contain a dual system of protections: low flow "trig-
gers" which work in tandem with biological ones activated by a monitoring agency.
Dams are one of the primary sources of flow alteration in the State. Any
instream flow management scheme in Maine must be coordinated with the body of
legislation that controls flow regulation below dams. This means that there should
be no jurisdictional barriers dividing consumptive use decisionmaking and regu-
lated flow decisionmaking. The best way to avoid this divide, is to allow a single
agency, a separate administrative body composed of members of each concerned
agency, to control instream flow policy.
c. Permits
The operative component of a regulated riparian system is the permit. Func-
tionally, the permit is used to keep track of the available safe yield 30 5 and to pro-
vide a means of enforcement. 306 They are also useful for incorporating procedural
requirements, attaching conditions, financing administrative costs and ensuring
the availability of hydrological data. 307 Permits must be stable enough to provide
expectations to those who obtain them and flexible enough to adjust for sudden
ecological changes.
Permit duration has sparked much debate. 308 Proponents of long duration or
even perpetual permits assert that they are necessary to stimulate investment in the
water resources. Proponents of short term permitting seek frequent redistribution
of the resources in order to accommodate new users and recondition permits to suit
changing ecological needs. A balance must be struck that "provide[s] a sufficient
period to enable investors to accomplish their goals, or at least amortize their in-
vestment, while preventing the monopolization of water by the earliest users."'309
Twenty years is the most common duration. 3 10 In Maine, where water manage-
ment has only recently become a source of debate, and complete hydrological data
304. ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-I-9-10B-30 (Supp. 2000).
305. See RRMWC § 3R-2-01-04, 7R-l-01(e) (1).
306. Id. § 5R-4-01-5R-4-04.
307. Id. § 7R-l-01.
308. 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 9.03(a)(4).
309. Id. § 9.03(a)(4), at 464.
310. This is the duration used in the RRMWC (§ 7R-1-02). But see Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.236 (West 2000) (50 years); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-97(a) (2001) (50 years);
Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-9(1) (1972) (10 years); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. ENVIR.
§§ 5-510 (1996) (2 years); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-215 (Michie 2000) (1 year).
Other systems allow for permit durations that last for the period of the investment. See RRMWC
§ 7R-1-02; North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.16(a) (1999).
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is incomplete, it seems unwise to issue lengthy permits that will lock agencies into
levels of use that may have not been correctly set.
Water monopolies may be avoided by making water rights transferable. Trans-
fers may be encouraged or coerced in a variety of ways: (1) agencies may refuse to
renew permits 31 1; (2) agencies may alter permits upon renewal3 12; (3) water rights
may be directly transferable under the regulatory scheme; or (4) new users may
secure restrictive easements from existing permitted users in order to "free-up"
water. Perhaps the most efficient method is to allow direct transfer of permitted
rights within a watershed subject to environmental review by an agency such as
the DEP.
Permits conditions may be used as an additional environmental safeguard.
The issuance of a water allocation permit in Massachusetts' triggers that state's
environmental impact review statute. Similarly, Delaware and Vermont require
the completion of various environmental investigations and alternatives analyses.
More common provisions require record keeping or the payment of fees. 313
Finally, permits enable enforcement. Violating the terms of a permit may
subject the permit holder to penalties, or legal action (civil and/or criminal), or
result in suspension or revocation. 3 14
In Maine, administration of the permit scheme is an important consideration.
Traditionally, resource management has been jurisdictionally divided between the
organized and unorganized portions of the State. For example, modification of a
stream bank is subject to a DEP administered Natural Resources Protection Act
(NRPA) permit in an organized municipality, and a LURC administered Compre-
hensive Plan permit in an unorganized township.3 15 Consistent results are estab-
lished, in theory, by requiring the LURC's plan to accord with the requirements of
the NRPA. This traditional division of labor may make it more efficient to opt for
shared administration of a water management statute between LURC and the DEP
In order to ensure consistency across the State a single agency, the DEP, should be
responsible for setting and reviewing optimal flow levels. Aside from that func-
tion, both agencies would be equally responsible for issuing, monitoring and en-
forcing permits in their respective jurisdictions.
C. Constitutional Considerations: Private Property Limitations on Flow Regulation
1. The Federal Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution stands as a barrier
between public environmental concerns and private property interests.3 16 The
"takings" clause marks the boundary beyond which environmental restrictions on
311. 1 Beck, supra note 60, at 493-500 (noting that renewal is often premised on the contin-
ued reasonableness of the use).
312. Id. § 9.03(d), at 509-12; see also Delaware, Regulations Governing the Allocation of
Water § 1.01 (1987) (making use of the doctrine of equitable apportionment).
313. 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 9.03(d) at 509-12. See also RRMWC § 4R-1-07 to 08.
314. See 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 9.03(d) at 509-12.
315. Infra Part II.C.3.C.
316. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,




the exercise of private property rights may not be placed without the payment of
just compensation. A permit based water allocation scheme places finite limits on
the use of privately held riparian rights. Riparian rights are appurtenant to the
ownership of real property and are, accordingly, viewed as a form of private prop-
erty. Nonetheless, riparian rights are considered incomplete property interests,
and the expectations held by a riparian proprietor are somewhat weaker than pri-
vately held interests in real property. 3 17
Riparian rights are given less constitutional protection due to their usufructory
nature. The right to use water has never been recognized as an absolute or com-
plete property interest. 3 18 Similarly, the public's interest in water, as a shared
resource, often prevails over private property rights to appropriate it. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes put this limitation forward in the oft-cited Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter:
[I]t appears to us that few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to main-
tain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the pur-
pose of turning them to a more perfect use. The public interest is omnipresent
wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as population grows. It is
fundamental, and we are of the opinion that the private property of riparian pro-
prietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots. Whether it be said that such an
interest justifies the cutting down by statute, without compensation, in the exer-
cise of police power, of what otherwise would be private rights of property, or
that apart from statute those rights do not go to the height of what the defendant
seeks to do, the result is the same.... The private right to appropriate is subject
to not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it may
not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and
health. 319
Finally, public water use rights protected by the public trust doctrine limit private
ownership of navigable waters.32 0 These legal limitations on private ownership of
water have, for the most part, discouraged federal constitutional challenges to water
regulation on takings grounds among the eastern states. 32 1
In spite of the lesser property status of water rights, the takings clause cannot
be ignored. The current takings framework analysis that has formed from the
series of relatively recent Supreme Court cases provides a number of consider-
ations for states imposing environmental regulations: (1) the restriction must "sub-
317. See ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 458 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter MELTZ ET AL., THE THE TAKINGS ISSUE].
318. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) ("In virtue of
this ownership he has a right to the use of the water.... But, strictly speaking, he has no
property in the water itself; but a simple use of it while it passes along."); United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) ("Rights, property or otherwise, which are
absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them.").
319. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
320. See Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the
"Takings" Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 95
(1995). See generally Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Pro-
tection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407 (1986).
321. See Omemik v. Wisconsin, 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974) (cited in 1 Beck, supra note 60,
§ 9.04(a) note 734).
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stantially advance legitimate state interests" 322 ; (2) the presence of a "roughly
proportional" 323 "essential nexus" 324 between the asserted state interest and the
restrictions imposed; (3) the degree to which the restrictions imposed impair "in-
vestment-backed expectations" 32 5; and (4) the level of economic devaluation of
the property affected. 326
Challenges to regulated riparianism are most likely to allege interference with
investment backed expectations. To the extent that such a claim is colorable, states
have tried to avoid such challenges by treating existing consumptive uses differ-
ently from new ones.327 Interference with the economic expectations and obliga-
tions of existing users during the transition to regulated water use may be mini-
mized by allowing current users to simply register withdrawals based on past lev-
els of use within a given period of time after water restrictions take effect. Permits
must then be obtained for all new uses. Where the safe yield is already fully ap-
propriated by existing users, new users may be forced purchase transferable water
rights from them. Registrations may then lapse after a period of time and be re-
placed by permits.
It is questionable, however, whether such precautions are necessary to guard
against federal takings challenges. A significant exception to the Takings Clause
involves uses of private property that violate "existing rules or understandings" of
state law.32 8 One such "existing rule or understanding" of Maine law is the public
servitude for fish passage; and the public use rights of navigation, fishing and
fowling.329 Although non-navigable rivers are recognized by Maine common law
as private (non-trust) property, land uses that interfere with state public use rights
elsewhere may be restricted without incurring takings liability because the land
was subject to "pre-existing limitation[s] upon the landowner's title."'330 Simi-
larly, a state may invoke its police power to prevent nuisances without running
322. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
323. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring a "rough proportionality"
between the benefits derived from the regulation and its financial impact on those regulated).
324. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
325. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
326. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992) (holding that
the deprivation of all economically viable use of land is a taking per se). See also Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 18 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Love Ladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F,3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
327. 1 Beck, supra note 60, § 9.04(a).
328. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1030. The Lucas Court stated the
following:
In light of our traditional resort to "existing understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law" to define the range of interests that qualify for
protection as "property" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments .. , this recog-
nition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner is barred
from putting land to use that is proscribed by those "existing rules or understandings"
is surely unexceptional.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
329. See generally Graham G. Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 ME. L. REV. 161,
172-73 (1965).
330. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
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afoul of the Takings Clause.33 1 Both exceptions would be applicable if Maine
were to regulate riparianism. The imposition of a partial regulatory restriction on a
qualified private property rights, such as riparian water rights, does not amount to
a taking under the federal Constitution, because landowners acquired title to their
land subject to preexisting restraints on its use.
2. Protection of Water Rights Under The Maine State Constitution
Constitutional guarantees of private property protection are largely the same
under the Federal and Maine State Constitutions. 332 State and federal interpreta-
tions of these rights vary somewhat with respect to private property interests in
water, however. Although the Law Court has said that a riparian proprietor "does
not own the water itself .... but he has... the right to the use and benefit of it,"3 33
it has also issued a number of other statements which afford riparian rights signifi-
cant constitutional protection. In a 1917 advisory opinion to the State legislature,
the Law Court stated:
The only limitation upon the absolute rights of riparian proprietors in non-
tidal rivers and streams is the public right of passage.... Subject to this qualified
right of passage, non-tidal rivers and streams are absolutely private.
... All the rights which the riparian proprietor has in the running streams
are as certain, as absolute, and as inviolable as any other species of property, and
constitute a part of his land as much as the trees that grow thereon, or the mill or
the house that he builds thereon. He can be deprived of them only through the
power of eminent domain constitutionally exercised. 334
In Hamor v. Bar Harbor Water Co.335 the Court considered the legality of allow-
ing a State chartered corporation to divert water away from downstream riparians
in order to supply a nearby town with drinking water. The Court held that:
There can be no question but that the act granting the right to the defendants to
take, detain, and use the water from the sources, and for the purposes therein
specified, is constitutional. The decisions are numerous that private property
may be taken by the sovereign power of the government, in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, for purposes of public utility .... In such case the
interests of the public, from considerations affecting the health and comfort of
densely populated communities, require that private property may be thus appro-
priated for uses which are deemed public. It is thus that the right of property of
331. This is known as the "nuisance exception to the taking[s] guarantee." Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[A]II property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."). The Lucas decision, which
dealt with the so-called "total taking," narrowed the nuisance exception's application to only
those situations where it is necessary to prevent "grave threats to the lives and property of oth-
ers." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16. But, in doing so, the
Court neither explicitly overruled or criticized Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictus,
480 U.S. 470 (1987), in which the Court expressly reaffirmed the exception in the context of
partial takings. See MELT7 ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 189.
332. Me. Const. Art. I, § 21 ("Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just
compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it.").
333. Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 507 (1917).
334. Id.
335. 78 Me. 127, 3 A. 40 (1886).
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private individuals, whether it be in lands, or the usufructory interest in flowing
water, is made to subserve the public exigencies, and for which, under the consti-
tution, "just compensation" is guaranteed and must be made.336
Nearly a century later, in Kennebunk, Kennebunkport and Wells Water District v.
Maine Turnpike Authority,337 the Law Court again considered the constitutional-
ity of state interference with the rights of riparian proprietors: There is no reason
why the same requirements should not apply equally to the taking of water from a
stream in which the plaintiffs have valuable riparian rights as to the taking of land.
Both are equally the subjects of property and of compensation... .-338
It is true that the waters of such streams may be taken for a public use. This may
be done by the State itself [or] by a public Agency created by the State.... Such
taking and diminution of the rights of the riparian proprietors, be they either
upper or lower proprietors, however, is the taking of private property for a public
use, and this can be accomplished only in the manner prescribed by law and then
only when fair compensation is paid therefor[e]. 339
In 1966, shortly after deciding the Kennebunk case, the Law Court was called
upon once more, in its advisory capacity, to consider the legality of a proposed
piece of legislation that would have resulted in depriving riparian proprietors of
their usufructory rights to estuarine waters. 340 In its opinion the Court reaffirmed
"[t]hat the State may take such riparian rights ... by eminent domain proceedings"
but only on the condition of payment of just compensation. 34 1
The state actions challenged, or discussed, in the cases cited above are distinct
from the enactment of a water management scheme. In both the Hamor and
Kennebunk cases, the State was appropriating water to its own use, significantly
curtailing water rights in the process. Moreover, both cases involved uses of the
appropriated water that benefited but a single locality. By proposing to regulate
stream flow on Maine rivers, the State is not appropriating water for its own use,
but acting to prevent an adverse impact of a particular class of land uses, some-
thing which results in diffuse public benefits. There is no "taking" in such a case,
because landowners never possessed a right to withdraw water to the detriment of
the waterbody.
Further, in the Law Court's 1966 advisory opinion, it reviewed an absolute
deprivation of riparian rights. By comparison, regulated riparianism does not com-
pletely extinguish the water rights of private landowners. Rather, it limits these
rights in an attempt to coordinate competing resource demands and to safeguard
one of Maine's most valuable natural resources.
More recently, the state has developed a takings analysis that is designed to
determine when a state "has gone too far." This analysis was first expressed in
Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission342 : "The proper
procedure for analyzing takings questions is to determine the value of the property
at the time of the governmental restriction and compare that with its value after-
336. Id. at 132, 3 A. at 41 (emphasis added).
337. 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d 520 (1950).
338. Id. at 50, 71 A.2d at 529 (quoting Hamor v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 78 Me. 127, 134, 3 A.
40,42 (1886)).
339. Id. at 48, 71 A.2d at 528.
340. Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 656 (Me. 1966).
341. Id. at 660.
342. 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982).
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wards, to determine whether the diminution, if any, is so substantial as to strip the
property of all practical value."'343
A similar approach may been seen in recent statutory attempts to establish
clear cut rules for takings, by requiring compensation for state actions that result in
losses of value of greater than a certain percentage. 344 It is difficult to see how
partial limitations on riparian water rights could result in such a significant loss in
property value.
Put simply, fear of incurring takings challenges, grounded in either the Maine
Constitution or the Federal Constitution, should not be the overriding concern of
regulators contemplating the transition to managed water consumption.
IV. CONCLUSION
The flow of Maine's fresh water is controlled by a system of common law
rights that applies unevenly to surface water and groundwater, running water and
standing, navigable and non-navigable. The venerable doctrine of riparian rights,
premised on sharing and reasonable use, operates only where water is consistently
abundant and relatively untapped. In times of scarcity, however, the riparian sys-
tem inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons, damaging the State's most criti-
cal ecosystems. A patchwork of single purpose statutes has been erected that flatly
ignores the hydrological connections between related resources. Water manage-
ment, to the extent that it exists at all, is fragmented not only across water classifi-
cation, but also across jurisdiction. Large-scale irrigation is unrestricted in one
location while only a few miles away, on the other side of a county line, water
withdrawn from the same river is controlled by permit. This type of management
is not only ecologically irresponsible, it is patently unfair to those involved.
Developing administratively unenforceable flow standards for Maine's rivers
by rulemaking under statutes that are ill-suited for the purpose will only add to the
ad hoc-ery and inconsistency that characterizes the present state of Maine water
law. By developing, instead, a comprehensive scheme for managing instream flow
and groundwater withdrawal the State will better serve its future, especially in
light of recent spurts of growth in both population and industry. The hesitation
thus far is mainly due to the misconception that all environmental protections nec-
essarily lead to economic hardship. This misunderstanding is especially unwar-
ranted in Maine where flowing waters foster instream uses of rivers and ponds that
have traditionally been one of the backbones of Maine's rural economy. Until that
mindset is discarded, however, those species that rely on, and those people who
use, value and appreciate, water in a river will be at the mercy of those who, merely
by virtue of their location, can siphon it out in any way and in any amount they
choose.
343. Id. at 482.
344. See L.D. 1990 (119th Legis. 1999), AN ACT To REQUIRE ECONOMIC AND TAKING IMPACT
ANALYSES TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS.
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